

**JPRS-UPS-84-113**

**20 December 1984**

# **USSR Report**

**POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS**

**PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA**

**No. 4, July-August 1984**

**FBIS**

**FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE**

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

20 December 1984

**USSR REPORT**  
**POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS**

**PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA**

No. 4, July-August 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal **NARODY AZII I AFRIKI**, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

**CONTENTS**

English Summaries of Major Articles (pp 219-221).....	1
Information on Authors (p 218).....	6
Egypt Under Sadat Regime Contrasted with Al-Nasir Period (pp 3-14) (A. G. Knyazev).....	8
Universal Trade Companies and the Export of Capital from Japan (pp 14-24) (A. V. Kollontay) (not translated)	
Conflict Over Secular vs. Islamic Orientation of Turkish State (pp 25-33) (D. Ye. Yeremeyev).....	22
1947 Conference on Asia (Based on Information from English Archives) (pp 34-43) (G. B. Goroshko) (not translated)	
Policy of Imperialist Powers in Indochina at End of World War II (pp 44-51) (V. T. Pavlov) (not translated)	
Methods of Traditional Chinese Philosophy (pp 52-62) (A. I. Kobzev) (not translated)	
Manuscripts of Konstantin Ivanovich Chaykin (pp 63-75) (Yu. Ye. Borshchhevskiy, Leningrad) (not translated)	

CONTENTS (Continued)

Abu al-Faraj Runi and Abu al-Faraj Sagzi (pp 76-80) (I. Ikramov, Kulyab) (not translated)	
Ethiopian Methods for Indoctrinating Socialism Described (pp 81-87) (Ye. S. Sherr).....	31
Organized Movement of Indian Rural Proletariat (pp 88-95) (A. M. Mel'nikov) (not translated)	
Western Saharan Problem's Origins, Current Status Examined (pp 96-103) (L. P. Andreyev, N. P. Podgornova).....	38
Iranian Rejection of Western Bourgeois Culture Analyzed (pp 104-111) (A. M. Grebnev).....	48
An Inquiry into the Issue of National Adaptation (The Russian Classics in the East) (pp 112-117) (L. Ye. Cherkasskiy) (not translated)	
Conference on Political Structures in Asian Developing States (pp 118-122) (V. A. Fedorov).....	58
All-Union Conference on Arab Culture (pp 123-130) (S. B. Pevzner, V. I. Maksimenko, A. G. Belova) (not translated)	
Study of Tibetan Medicine in the USSR and Abroad (pp 131-135) (N. D. Bolsokhoyeva, Ulan-Ude) (not translated)	
African Studies Centers in Belgium (pp 136-141) (O. V. Vlasov) (not translated)	
Calendar of Events (pp 142-149) (portions not translated)	
Nigeria Subject of Symposium for Soviet, Bloc Scholars (pp 146-147).....	64
An. Gromyko at Soviet-Italian Roundtable on African Problems (pp 147-149).....	66
Dissertations Defended (Second Half of 1983) (pp 149-151) (not translated)	
Literary History of Nusantara: New Publications and Studies (pp 152-162) (B. B. Parnikel') (not translated)	
Study of Sources in the Contemporary East (Notes on Jan Reizem's Book 'The Informational Analysis of Social Processes') (pp 163-169) (Ye. B. Rashkovskiy) (not translated)	

## CONTENTS (Continued)

### Book Reviews

Book on Pakistan's State-Monopoly Bourgeois Link Reviewed (pp 170-174) (N. A. Simoniya).....	69
Book on Economic Integration of Asian Countries Reviewed (pp 175-177) (Yu. M. Osipov).....	76
Review of 'Tajik Folklore. Volume I. Animal Fables and Tales,' compiled by I. Levin, Dzh. Rabihev and M. Yavich (pp 178-183) (Ye. A. Kostyukhin, Leningrad) (not translated)	
Review of 'The Crisis of External Dependence. The Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh' (in English) by Rehman Sobhan (pp 184-188) (A. Ye. Granovskiy) (not translated)	
Review of 'International Bibliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology' (in French) (pp 189-194) (A. V. Paneyakh, Leningrad) (not translated)	

### Book Reports

Report on 'Social Thought in West Africa. 1918-1939' by A. B. Letnev (pp 195-197) (V. B. Iordanskiy) (not translated)	
Monograph on Nigerian Proletarian Formation Reviewed (pp 198-200) (A. S. Oganova).....	80
Report on 'History Judges the Young Turks' (in Armenian) by Dzh. Kirakosyan (pp 200-202) (Yu. A. Petrosyan, Leningrad) (not translated)	
Report on 'Molon Toyin's Journey into Hell. Altan Gerel's Translation' (in English) by L. Lorincz, and on 'The Vimalakirti Sutra in Mongolian. The Ergilu-a Rincin Edition' (in French) by G. Kara (pp 203-204) (A. G. Sazykin, Leningrad) (not translated)	
Report on 'Somali Proverbs and Sayings,' compiled by G. D. Kapchits and edited by G. L. Permyakov (pp 205-207) (A. D. Lutskov) (not translated)	

List of Principal Scholarly Works of Professor V. I. Pavlov, Doctor of  
Historical Sciences (On His 60th Birthday) (p 208)  
(not translated)

List of Principal Scholarly Works of Doctor of Historical Sciences M. A.  
Gasratyan (On His 60th Birthday) (p 209)  
(not translated)

List of Principal Scholarly Works of Professor M-N. O. Osmanov, Doctor  
of Philological Sciences (On His 60th Birthday) (p 210)  
(not translated)

CONTENTS (Continued)

**In Memory of Sergey Ivanovich Tyul'panov (p 212)**  
**(not translated)**

**In Memory of Grigoriy Fedorovich Dakhshleyger (pp 213-215)**  
**(R. B. Suleymenov, Alma-Ata) (not translated)**

**In Memory of Dmitriy Georgiyevich Voronovskiy (p 216)**  
**(B. V. Lunin, Tashkent) (not translated)**

**In Memory of Andrey Ivanovich Sokolov (pp 216-217)**  
**(not translated)**

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA  
No 4, July-August 1984

Russian title : NARODY AZII I AFRIKI

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : A. A. Kutsenkov

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo "Nauka"

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : July-August 1984

Signed to press : 31 July 1984

Copies : 3,561

COPYRIGHT : "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy  
literatury, 1984

## INTERNATIONAL

### ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 219-221

[Text] Political and Ideological Evolution of Egypt After Nasser

A. G. Knyazev

The article deals with Egyptian politics after G. A. Nasser. It examines the factors which caused the departure of Egypt from its progressive policy. Special attention is paid to the "open door policy" (infitah), the bourgeois liberalization under A. Sadat, and the policy through which the political structure of the state was attuned to its antisocialist orientation.

It is demonstrated that in the 1970's the leading positions in the country were captured by the class alliance of bureaucracy, corrupted parasitic bourgeoisie, reactionary elements of the clergy and army. The objectives and goals of these forces run counter to the national interest.

The article reveals the class nature of the system of "controlled democracy" introduced by A. Sadat and the inevitability in this regard of the resort to violence on the part of the Egyptian elite. It shows that the "democratization" of social life was used to camouflage the authoritarian nature of the regime and to please Western partners. The post-Sadat period is marked by the abandonment of the most offensive aspects of national policy, although, basically, the regime sticks to the conceptions which had been formulated during the Sadat period.

The article notes that the rapid transformation of the regime, once a vanguard country of socialist orientation, is accounted for by the negative phenomena which had emerged as far back as the 1960's due to the very nature of the revolutionary democracy, the vague nature of its ideology, the inconsistent implementation of fundamental programs and its striving to occupy "classless" positions.

Universal Trade Companies and Export of Capital from Japan

A. V. Kollontai

Over the past decade Japan has grown into the third largest exporter of capital after the USA and England. Pursuing the policy of direct investment,

Japanese monopolies capture world markets and turn into full-fledged competitors of advanced capitalist countries and agents of Japanese neocolonialism in the developing world.

The article examines the participation of Universal Trade Companies (UTC) in the export of capital in the 1970's and early 1980's and their leading role in running the activity of Japanese monopolies worldwide. It is demonstrated that UTC's, as specific monopoly structures, have secured leading positions in external economic relations and have set up an extensive network of enterprises located outside Japan, which are under their control. In their capacity of major exporters of manufactures and importers of raw materials they enjoy government support which facilitates their activity abroad.

The article notes that in the context of the deterioration of the international economic situation in the mid-1970's and owing to the rapid growth of the foreign investments of Japanese industrial companies, the organization of the UTC's activity abroad assumes a special significance.

#### Islam and Political Struggle in Modern Turkey

D. Ye. Yeremeyev

The social and political role of Islam, which had been ousted from Turkish politics in the 1930's and early 1940's by the Kemalists' reforms, has been considerably enhanced over the past 30 years. The transformation of Islam into a political instrument is primarily related to the activity of the Democratic Party, especially when it was in office, i.e. in the 1950's and 1960's.

Although the military coup of 1960 restrained the political influence of Islam, it has been growing ever since. By the late 1960's the Party for National Order and the Nationalist Action Party introduced Islamic slogans into their propaganda and party programs.

The new coup of 1971 and the banning of the Party for National Order, which followed, the persecution by law of Muslim sectarians diminished the social role of Islam. But gradually it has revived its offensive character and became an ideological platform of the National Salvation Party. The Nationalist Action Party also resorted to Islam along with Pan-Turkism in its propaganda.

The military coup of 1980 put an end to the activity of all legal parties. The military authorities condemned, *inter alia*, the use of Islam for political purposes.

The Kemalist reforms have been realized by and large in the superstructure and have hardly affected social and economic relations. Neither did they solve the agrarian problems. Many feudal left-overs are still there, in particular in the eastern provinces. This is the main reason for the vitality of the Islamic ideology among the peasantry.

The development of Turkey along capitalist lines has exacerbated social contrasts and has brought about agrarian overpopulation, unemployment and rising prices. Islam and its propagation of universal equality before Allah and the dogma of social justice have found response not only among peasants but also among workers, artisans and employees, who suffered from the lowered standard of living. Capitalist development has undermined the economic positions of the petty bourgeoisie and a segment of the middle one and caused resentment of these classes. The standard of culture of the people remains low, especially that of the peasants, the vast majority of whom are illiterate. This is another factor of the preservation of religious consciousness. And, last but not least, the Turkish Government on its part has not always been consistent in pursuing the policy of secularism. The departure from this policy, which dates back to 1948-49 when the government of the Republican People's Party was in office, became more pronounced under the government of the Democratic Party (1950-60) and that of the Justice Party (1965-71) and under the coalition of right parties (1975-76 and 1979-80).

#### First Asian Relations Conference of 1947

G. B. Goroshko

The article investigates the position of the British diplomacy on the eve of and during the First Asian Relations Conference, which was held in Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947, that is, prior to the attainment of independence.

Based on British archive documents, which were released in the 1970's, the article not only sheds light upon the activities of British diplomacy in India in 1946-47, but provides a deeper insight into the Anglo-British relations of this period.

The data presented in the article offer an opportunity to elucidate some versions regarding the history of the conference. It is of significant interest, for there is conflicting evidence as to the nature of the conference, its membership and the participation of Soviet delegates from Soviet Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

#### Imperialist Powers' Policy in Indochina at End of Second World War

V. T. Pavlov

The struggle for Indochina, a strategically important region, exacerbated the contradiction between the imperialist powers in the last phase of the Second World War. On 9 March 1945 the Japanese militarists staged a military and political coup in the countries of Indochina and took over. The Japanese proclaimed Vietnam an "independent" state and asked the emperor, Bao Dai, to cooperate in the cause of building a "great East Asia." The same comedy was played in Cambodia (Kampuchea) and Luangprabang (Laos). After the coup the supreme power in these states passed to the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army. The Japanese militarists became full-fledged masters of the region and started its exploitation in terms of human and mineral resources.

The defeat of fascist Germany, most of the credit for which goes to the Soviet Union, has a great impact upon the national liberation movement in Indochina.

The leaders of the Communist Party of Indochina and Vietminh pursued a far-reaching policy to bring about liberation. It was at this stage of the struggle that France made it clear that it was eager to get Indochina back and keep it as a colony. It refused to wage a joint struggle against the Japanese invaders. Along with Japan, France started to fish in the waters of local politics, trying to use the local elite in order to secure dominating positions in the region and break the masses away from the Communist Party of Indochina and Vietminh. The Japanese tried their best to create a pro-Japanese front as a counterweight to Vietminh.

The declaration of war by the Soviet Union against Japan and the subsequent defeat of the Kwantung Army led to the Japanese debacle. The masses of Indochina, guided by the historic documents adopted by the Communist Party of Indochina on 12 March 1945 and program documents of Vietminh, rose in struggle against the Japanese invaders and their stooges.

The 2nd of September, 1945, went down into the annals of Vietnamese history. It marked the collapse of the Japanese and French colonial policy and the emergence of an independent Vietnam.

#### Methodology of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

A. I. Kobzev

The article is an attempt to identify the specific features of the traditional Chinese philosophy (that is independent of the Western influence) in terms of its methodology. The formal logic, a universal methodology of the European philosophy, evolved on the basis of a developed idealism. The latter never rose in China, where the traditional philosophical thought has always developed within the framework of naturalism. Hence, China did not produce a formal logic of its own. Its functional analogue became the methodology of numerology with its mathematical and quasimathematical structures. These structures, however, are in the main interrelated not in accordance with mathematical laws but in their own way: symbolically, through associations and facts, aesthetically, mnemonically, etc.

The Chinese equivalent of the term "numerology"--*hsiang shu hsieh* (a teaching of symbols and numerals) reflects a twofold nature of this phenomenon, its "geometrical" and "arithmetical" aspects. All numerical structures here have their equivalents in terms of space and geometry and vice versa. Their action equally expands both on the context of certain conceptions and the form in which they are presented, that is, on the syntax and architectonics of texts. Three fundamental numerals, 2, 3 and their sum total of 5, underly the standard numerological schemes. Two major producing models (which create the range from 1 to 10,000 things), i.e twofold and the threefold ones, are related to these schemes and are recorded in "Hsi-ts'i chuan" and "Tao-te ching." These models produced 64 hexograms of "Chou-i" and 81 tetragrams of "T'ai-hsuan ching"; the "magic cross" of Ho-t'u and the "magic square" of Lo-shu; "Ch'ien tzu wen" and "San-tzu ching"; the doctrines of Shao Yung and Ts'ai Tsin-feng.

The article offers a summary table of twin numerological categories. The evolution of numerology underwent a qualitative change in the neo-Confucianism

of the Sung period when the numerological instruments became an object of extensive theoretical analysis. It was in this period that the principal numerological text "Chou-i" came to head the 13 canonical books (Shi-san ching).

The article argues against the widespread notion of the complete departure of Chinese philosophy from the natural sciences as its specific defect. It is suggested that a unified numerological methodology played the role of a connecting link here. While in Europe scholars could neglect philosophy and treat their logical methodology as a pure science (and first pure science was no other discipline but logic), the Chinese scholars always considered their numerological methodology as a pure philosophy and therefore could not neglect it. Notably, the indivisibility of such notions in China as "philosophy" and "science" testifies to this. The evolution of philosophy and science in Europe, proved possible owing to their breaking away from each other as early as the third century BC, which traditional China never knew.

The study of individual numerological phenomena was made by M. Granet, V. S. Spirin and A. M. Karapetyan but the conception of their numerological methodology as a universal Organon of the Chinese philosophy and science was worked out by A. I. Kobzev. It is substantiated by the analysis of such classical treatises as "Chou-i," "Mo-tzu," "Lun-yu," "Tso chuan," "Tao-te ching," "Huai-nan-tzu," "T'ai-hsuan ching," "T'ai-chi t'u shuo," etc.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

CSO: 1812/32-E

## INTERNATIONAL

### INFORMATION ON AUTHORS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) p 218

[Text] Kollontay, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, researcher at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Yeremeyev, Dmitriy Yevgen'yevich, doctor of historical sciences and professor at the Asia and Africa Institute of the Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov.

Goroshko, Galina Borisovna, candidate of historical sciences and docent at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Pavlov, Vladimir Tikhonovich, lecturer in the World History Department of the University of Friendship Among Peoples imeni P. Lumumba.

Kobzev, Artem Igorevich, candidate of philosophy and researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Borshchevskiy, Yurii Yefimovich, researcher in the Leningrad Branch of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. Died on 2 April 1984.

Ikramov, Iskandar, candidate of philological sciences and senior instructor at the Kulyab State Pedagogical Institute.

Sherr, Yevgeniy Sergeyevich, candidate of economic sciences and researcher at the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Mel'nikov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, candidate of historical sciences and researcher at the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Grebnev, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Cherkasskiy, Leonid Yevseyevich, doctor of philological sciences and researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

**Fedorov, Vasiliy Andreyevich, candidate of historical sciences and researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**Pevzner, Sergey Borisovich, candidate of historical sciences and researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**Bolsokhoyeva, Natal'ya Danilovna, candidate of philological sciences and researcher at the Institute of the Social Sciences, Buryat Branch, Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**Vlasov, Oleg Vital'yevich, researcher at the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**Parnikel', Boris Borisovich, candidate of philological sciences and researcher at the Institute of World Literature imeni A. M. Gor'kiy, USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**Pashkovskiy, Yevgeniy Borisovich, candidate of historical sciences and researcher at the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.**

**COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984**

8588

CSO: 1807/60

INTERNATIONAL

EGYPT UNDER SADAT REGIME CONTRASTED WITH AL-NASIR PERIOD

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press  
31 Jul 84) pp 3-13

[Article by A. G. Knyazev: "Internal Political and Ideological Development in Post-Nasir Egypt"]

[Text] While A. Sadat was the president of Egypt (1970-1981), this country which had been in the vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement of the Near and Middle East in the 1950's and 1960's took a perceptible step backward in socioeconomic and politico-ideological development. The policy of the "open door" and economic "liberalization"--the so-called "infitah," with the aid of which the Egyptian leadership promised to put the country on the road to prosperity--actually led to a severe crisis in the socioeconomic structure, an increase in corruption and parasitical consumer attitudes and the intensification of social inequality. The bases of the sociopolitical system established in Egypt during the years of progressive reform were undermined.

Obviously, it would be an oversimplification to blame the rapid degeneration of the regime, which made the transition to the "infitah" possible, on the actions of only A. Sadat and his group. The external and internal conditions of the change of leadership in the AKE, the conditions which paved the way for the entry of the political arena by a man like A. Sadat, must also be taken into account. We must not forget that rightwing forces were more active in the Arab world by the beginning of the 1970's. The defeat of the Arab countries in 1967 considerably strengthened the conservative bloc headed by Saudi Arabia. With the aid of petrodollars, it began to play an increasingly important role in inter-Arab relations. The Arab national bourgeoisie began to depart from anti-imperialist positions.

In spite of progressive changes in production and social relations, Egypt's own development along socialist lines was contradictory. The reforms instituted by the revolutionary leadership headed by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir diminished the influence of feudal landowners and the grand and middle bourgeoisie but did not undermine the bases of capitalist production. The rural middle bourgeoisie did not suffer at all from the reforms and even became stronger. Although the agrarian reform in Egypt limited land holdings to 100 feddans,<sup>1</sup> there were 10,000 landowners with from 50 to 200 feddans in 1965 who owned 12.6 percent of all private farmland.<sup>2</sup> The national leadership took every opportunity to encourage non-exploitative capital, represented by the petty and middle bourgeoisie.

The inconsistency in the institution of progressive socioeconomic changes and in relations with the bourgeoisie stemmed from the prevailing Egyptian beliefs about the nature of the country's social development. Petty bourgeois, nationalist and even religious views were recorded in the Charter for National Action--the document recording the basic theory of the Egyptian revolution--along with isolated Marxist premises ("national socialism" was declared to be the "main" government policy in the charter in place of the earlier "Arab" or "Egyptian" socialism). J. al-Nasir wrote, for example: "We disagree with the communist countries on the concept of socialism. Their regimes are based on the dictatorship of the proletariat...but we want a democracy, and not a dictatorship, for the laboring public."<sup>3</sup> Believing that reforms could be instituted in the interest of the broad popular masses without involving these masses in the revolutionary struggle, the Nasir leadership did not establish the kind of effective political institution which could have guaranteed the continuation of progressive changes after the leader's departure from the political arena and the counteraction of the growing rightwing opposition within the regime. This approach stemmed from the desire of the revolutionary democrats to play a mediating role between the main social classes. An ideological and political struggle broke out within the regime between the revolutionary democratic right and left wings, especially after Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war. This battle, however, as well as the bourgeoisie's attempts to play a leading role were restrained by J. al-Nasir's incontestable authority.

After he died and reactionary rightwing nationalist forces, whose views were shared by his successor, gained the upper hand in national politics, the directions of Egypt's domestic political and ideological development changed rapidly. Sadat's very first speeches indicated an intention to make changes in domestic policy on the pretext of correcting "past mistakes." In his autobiography, "In Search of Identity," Sadat admitted that he intended to establish his own form of government, differing from Nasir's form, from his first days in office. "I explained to them (his colleagues--A. K.) that I could not do what Nasir had done. True, we never differed on general principles but we did differ on the means of reaching our goals."<sup>4</sup> The balance of power that had taken shape during the years of revolutionary reforms in the country and the great popularity of Nasir's slogans and principles of domestic and foreign policy, however, made immediate sweeping reforms in the system of political power and ideology impossible. Although Sadat constantly reaffirmed his faith in the basic documents of the Egyptian revolution and underscored the organic connection between his regime and Nasir's, he nevertheless declared in 1971 that the phase of "revolutionary legality" in Egyptian history had ended and the phase of "constitutional legality" had begun. This was the first sign of the coming revision of Nasir's main ideological premises. The declaration of this idea as an official state doctrine constituted unequivocal criticism of the Nasir period of Egyptian history. It turned out that the regime calling itself Nasir's successor actually believed that illegal means were used to suppress counterrevolutionary elements during the years of progressive revolutionary reform. The slogan about the "sovereignty of the law" was quite indicative in this respect. When Sadat used this term, he let the Egyptian bourgeoisie and landowners know that he, in contrast to Nasir, would not resort to extreme measures and did not intend to restrict the political or property rights of this class but, on the contrary, was prepared to cooperate

with it. Sadat reinforced the slogan in February 1971 with the announcement that financial compensation would be awarded to 5,000 large landowners for their confiscated land, with the return of the holdings of 800 landowners and with the decision not to continue the confiscation process. As D. Paldi, Italian researcher of contemporary Egyptian affairs, noted: "Sadat's first contact was with a class opposing the revolution."<sup>5</sup>

At this time Sadat also made an appeal for the implementation of the sixth principle of the revolution of July 1952--"the establishment of a true democracy,"<sup>6</sup> which, according to him, had not been done during the years of revolutionary reform. Now, with Sadat's encouragement, this Nasir principle began to be interpreted by the new regime's ideologists as "pure democracy" or "democracy for all." This obviously undermined the premises of the Charter for National Action, which defined the democratization of society in much more progressive terms back in 1962 and refuted the concepts of "class harmony" and "cooperation between labor and capital," which were so popular immediately after the revolution. The charter, the Program of 30 March 1968 and all other political documents of the Egyptian revolution declared the "supremacy of people's power," using the term to signify the power of the workers, peasants, soldiers, intelligentsia and the national "non-exploitative" bourgeoisie. These social forces were offered half of all the seats in elected government bodies by law. In spite of the conditional nature of this kind of differentiation, it did not merely signify the revolutionary leadership's acknowledgement of the presence of classes in the society but also indicated that the leadership sympathized with the laboring masses. The appeals for "pure democracy" and "democracy for all," on the other hand, were always made by the Egyptian bourgeoisie and liberal intelligentsia.

The energetic measures to eradicate Nasir's political and ideological legacy were connected with the institution of the policy of economic "infitah" in the middle of 1974. An essential condition for its success, according to the Sadat leadership, was participation by Egyptian and foreign private entrepreneurs--and active and interested participation--in the resolution of Egypt's economic problems. For this purpose, around 100 laws and instructions were drafted and adopted between 1974 and 1976 to encourage activity by private capital. The voluntarist and "elitist" nature of the decision to institute a new economic policy, the organization of the methods of implementing it by a bureaucratic staff without the participation of representatives of the bourgeoisie and the vacillation between the pretense of "democracy" and repression, however, all caused the bourgeoisie to suspect that Sadat merely wanted to use its financial and economic capabilities to emerge from the national crisis but had no intention of giving it any real power. Sadat, as rightwing Egyptian journalist Abul Fath wrote, was the "sole guarantee of the continuation of the 'infitah.'"<sup>7</sup> Members of bourgeois groups pointed out the fact that a policy could not be based only on the wishes and desires of a single individual but had to be supported by the entire political structure. The Egyptian bourgeoisie made its participation in these plans conditional upon broader political power, including participation in government policymaking.<sup>8</sup> An essentially similar position was taken by members of the Western business world who advised the transfer of control over the ARE economy to the Egyptian private sector; U.S. representatives underscored the impossibility of participation by American private capital in the plans for Egypt's development until its political system

had been altered to meet the standards of a "Western democracy." Sadat's American and other Western partners reinforced their demands with active pressure on Egypt and the ostentatious refusal to participate in the plans.<sup>9</sup>

The pressure exerted by Sadat's new class allies was not his only motive for the reorganization of the political system. His "liberalization" was also based on subjective considerations. In an attempt to divest himself of the total responsibility, unavoidable in this form of government, for the failure to solve all of Egypt's complex economic, domestic and foreign political problems, Sadat wanted to camouflage the authoritarian nature of his regime to the maximum. He decided to do this by making the transition to a "controlled democracy." According to this concept, it would be preferable for Sadat to share his authority not with the individuals he constantly manipulated, but with political organizations or parties under his control. Blaming them for his own mistakes was supposed to be much more convincing to the public than the constant accusation of the premiers, ministers and other officials he himself had appointed.

In view of this, all of the measures taken within the program for the "liberalization" of Egyptian politics under Sadat should obviously be regarded as a consciously and precisely planned campaign. With the aid of this program, the leadership hoped to win the trust and support of the local bourgeoisie, please its new Western partners and create a controllable valve to vent public dissatisfaction. And this was all. "Liberalization" was carried out only within the rigid limits serving the regime's purpose.

The reorganization of the political system of Egypt in the 1970's was a complicated process, affecting virtually all social forces and social strata of the multistructural Egyptian society. The entire preceding period of the development of the 1952 revolution, a period of almost 20 years, was dominated by the concept of the "alliance of the working people," represented by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).

The role of the ASU as the "sole representative of the working people's interests" was recorded in the fundamental political documents of the regime—the Charter for National Action, the Program of 30 March 1968 and the national constitution adopted during A. Sadat's first year in office. Any reorganization of the political system would naturally affect the ASU, one of the main offspring of the Nasir period, and this meant that the new leadership had to be quite cautious in its behavior. On the one hand, the total elimination of the ASU would be an overt challenge of the Nasir heritage, which, as Sadat continuously asserted, represented the legal basis of his regime. On the other hand, he had to consider the wishes of local and foreign capital and its insistence on the organization of a political system based on the bourgeois principle of "pluralism." Sadat observed great caution in his break with the Nasir political heritage. Whereas economic liberalization and a free hand for the private sector began to be discussed loudly immediately after Sadat took office, the idea of a different political system was first expressed in the October Document, which was not published until May 1974 and was the Sadat regime's first independent program. In this document, Sadat wrote: "I reject the appeals for the artificial split of national unity through the creation of

parties, but I also cannot agree with the theory of a single party which takes the masses under its control and deprives them of the chance to exercise political liberties."<sup>10</sup>

When Sadat began his reform of the political system, he tried at first to avoid the fundamental reorganization of the ASU, not to mention its total elimination. The bureaucratic machinery which had been taking shape for 18 years, particularly after the purge of 1971-1973, served as a convenient instrument for the control of political activity in the country and was also a refuge for politicians loyal to the regime. Sadat hoped to adapt the organization to the objectives and obligations of his own regime by divesting it of what he called its "conformity complex."

It is true that Sadat's willingness to carry out the bourgeoisie's demands was reflected more clearly in the ASU development plan announced at the end of that year. "The term alliance of the working people," Sadat said in this document, "is not dogma. This is not a usurpation of the rights of the popular masses to choose other concepts during any subsequent stage of national action."<sup>11</sup> The document also amended the interpretation of the term "national unity" in order to conceal its class-related purpose. In particular, it said that the main thing was the "common national interest, for the sake of which differences must be overcome."<sup>12</sup> Realizing that no political force in the country could be satisfied with this kind of minimal political reform, Sadat acknowledged the possibility of further changes in this direction and the possibility of "finding a more progressive form for the ASU, corresponding to the idea of many currents within its framework, with the ultimate aim of the unity of the organization and respect for majority opinions."<sup>13</sup> An official report prepared by Rifat al-Majub, first secretary of the ASU Central Committee, said, for example, that "although the idea of creating parties is excluded at this time, this is not a categorical rejection of the party system in the future."<sup>14</sup> Of course, the reference to parties was made in order to pacify the bourgeoisie and keep it in the regime's camp. In an interview, Sadat even said that he was seriously considering the establishment of the American type of two-party system in Egypt.

Although the exacerbation of the class struggle in Egyptian society motivated Sadat to establish an organizational framework for the expression of the views of different political forces, especially the Egyptian bourgeoisie, he nevertheless saw to it that the "liberalization" process would not lead to the loss of absolute control over domestic political processes. Later events proved that Sadat was trying to create several weak and amorphous political organizations under his total control. This was the reason for his idea of forming some kind of "rostrums" or "platforms" within the ASU, which was reflected in the decisions of the national ASU congress of 22-25 July 1975 (incidentally, the last in the organization's history). The ASU and its organs were supposed to become an arena of discussion and debate, and nothing more. "The rostrums will be political, and not social," the ASU Central Committee announcement stressed. "That means that each will represent workers, peasants and members of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia who adhere to a specific ideology."<sup>15</sup> All political activity outside the ASU framework was outlawed.

Nationwide debates on the political structure of the country occupied an important place in Egyptian political and ideological affairs in the 1970's.

They were organized by the regime to portray changes as an expression of public wishes rather than the implementation of administrative decrees, and they turned into a fierce struggle over future development alternatives, revealing all of the dissatisfaction of various social strata with the existing political system.

The Arab Socialist Union was the primary focal point of these feelings. Created by Nasir as a political organization of the entire laboring public for the mobilization of efforts in the struggle for progressive socioeconomic reforms, the ASU actually became a bureaucratic appendage of executive authority. It was criticized from the right and the left. The Right criticized the ASU as a symbol of the entire Nasir era, stating in particular that it "united Nasirism with communism on the basis of hatred for political freedom and democracy."<sup>16</sup> Egyptian leftist forces had a different view of the role and place of the ASU. The former editor-in-chief of the progressive magazine AT TALIA, L. el-Holi, remarked: "The ASU did not have enough real contact with the masses, it followed the lead of the executive authority and was headed by bureaucrats."<sup>17</sup>

The supporters of a multi-party system during the first phase of Sadat's reformist activity used many of the statements in his documents. Referring to the fact that the October Document did not categorically exclude the possibility of parties, but was merely against the "artificial split" of national unity, members of the bourgeoisie and the liberal intelligentsia advocated the limitation of the president's personal authority and the creation of a bourgeois parliamentary system.

Pro-Nasir ASU functionaries, trade unions, cooperatives and student unions defended the ASU as a symbol of the revolution of 23 July, stating only that the organization should be more democratic. Summarizing their views, prominent journalist Ahmed Bahaeddin wrote: "Despite all of its negative features, the ASU has been a good school for many Egyptian social strata, teaching them to defend their own point of view, protect their rights and engage in debates."<sup>18</sup> Egyptian leftist forces realized that the elimination of the ASU and the creation of a multi-party system would represent a step backward in the country's social development. They also realized that the nature of political power in the country under A. Sadat left no hope for the use of this "abstract," as progressive Egyptian philosopher Abd al-Azim Anis defined it, organization in the interests of workers and socialist reforms.<sup>19</sup> An influential segment of the leftist intelligentsia, united around the magazine AT TALIA, proposed that parties be created, but on the condition that they form a united national front based on the principles of the revolution of 23 July.

The struggle over the political structure roused various political circles to action. Within a short period of time, in February and March 1976, the ASU commission received around 40 applications for "rostrums," but Sadat used his rights as "arbiter" to sanction the creation of only 3--representing the Right, the center and the Left. Sadat assigned himself the role of "father of the nation," occupying a position above the "rostrums." On 4 March 1976 three organizations entered the Egyptian political arena within the ASU framework: the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization (EASO -- centrists), headed by Prime

Minister Mamduh Salim; the Socialist Liberals' Organization (SLO--rightists), headed by Chairman Mustafa Kamel Mourad of the National Assembly Economic Commission; the National Progressive Unionist Assembly (NPUA--leftists), headed by Khaled Muhieddin and uniting the progressive part of the intelligentsia, workers and employees.

The experiment in the creation of three political organizations immediately revealed the limits of the declared "democratization." Only the centrist organization, made up of members of the government, various links of the ASU and local government officials, received complete freedom of action.

A little more than half a year after the reorganization of the ASU, on 11 November 1976, Sadat decided to turn the ASU organizations into political parties. With this move, the president hoped to stay ahead of events and not allow the "rostrums" to turn into independent parties naturally--and, consequently, to escape his control. The presence of weak parties, even with opposition views, would not pose a real threat to the regime, Sadat believed, as long as he retained control over the obedient centrist party, which held an overwhelming majority of the seats in the National Assembly (around 300 out of 360). It is interesting that Sadat definitely denied the application for the creation of an independent Nasirist party. He made every effort to avoid the disclosure of Nasirism, with all of its political principles and philosophical views, as the opposition to his regime.

Marxists, the leftist intelligentsia, progressive students and part of the liberal bourgeoisie understood what Sadat was doing, but they nevertheless tried to make use of some features of the new policy line in their own interest. Above all, these were the very fact of the legal existence of leftists and their right to have their own organization and express their views openly. The appearance of the National Progressive Party (NPP), headed by an active participant in the 1952 revolution, Khaled Muhieddin, was a noteworthy event in the development of the Egyptian political system in the second half of the 1970's. In contrast to the vague and demagogic programs of the centrists and Socialist Liberals, the NPP program proposed specific solutions to the economic and domestic political crisis. It was the only political force in the country capable of suggesting alternative approaches in the areas of social security, economic reform and foreign policy.

A special law on parties was passed in July 1977 to give the system of "controlled democracy" a legal basis. The law had to be passed because the creation of new parties while the ASU was still in existence was contrary to the constitution and the 1972 law on national unity, which prohibited the "creation of organizations outside the ASU framework."<sup>20</sup> The new law prohibited the formation of parties on "the basis of class, social status or religion" and erected numerous obstacles to preclude the appearance of new parties without government approval.<sup>21</sup> The law on parties reaffirmed the regime's intention to regard political parties as subdivisions of a single political organization, differing only slightly from one another in the ideological respect. The new party system, which eliminated all ASU administrative bodies and low-level organizations, retained only the ASU Central Committee, which was assigned the functions of some kind of supraparty organ overseeing the creation and activities of parties.

The artificial nature of the "multi-party system" created in Egypt was clearly revealed in the fate of the New Wafd Party. The creation of this party was proposed by a group of politicians (F. Seraguddin, A. F. Hassan and I. Farag) connected with the Wafd Party, which was the largest party in prerevolutionary Egypt and was dissolved in 1952. Taking advantage of the dissatisfaction of much of the national Egyptian bourgeoisie and the liberal intelligentsia with Sadat's undemocratic methods of government and the domination of the national economy by parasitical capital, F. Seraguddin and his colleagues turned these feelings into the wish to create a liberal-bourgeois party. The activities of the neo-Wafdist were made legal by the new law on parties. Within a short time, the New Wafd Party gained authority in various sociopolitical circles in the country. The Wafdist movement also won definite sympathy in the West, where the New Wafd was regarded as a more acceptable political force than the parasitical Egyptian bureaucracy deriving advantages from the policy of "infitah." The rapid growth of the New Wafd attested to the Egyptian bourgeoisie's growing suspicions that the Sadat regime might not continue performing its main function--securing favorable conditions for the bourgeoisie's retention of the influence it had won in the country. In June 1978, Sadat tried to regain complete control over political processes in the country, even at the risk of losing his prestige as a "liberal" and "democrat," by openly suppressing the opposition, especially the leaders of the New Wafd Party. In this atmosphere, the New Wafd leaders decided to announce the party's self-dissolution in order to preserve its nucleus and have another chance to discredit the existing political system in the country.

By the end of the 1970's the severity of the internal political struggle and the growing opposition to his Middle East policy forced Sadat to make certain adjustments in his three-party system, as its basis--the centrist party--was incapable of securing mass support for the president's slogans and announced objectives. Sadat had to stop playing the role of "neutral arbiter" and to become directly involved in party activity. On 23 July 1978 the president officially announced his decision to create the National Democratic Party (NDP), which would function under his own personal guidance. At the same time, he announced the total dissolution of the ASU. The new Egyptian ruling party, created, just as its predecessor, the EASO, by a decision from above, was closely bound up with the government from the very beginning. The formation of the NDP put the opposition in an even more difficult position. The officially neutral status of the republic president had made it possible to criticize the government and the party formed by this government, but now it would actually be impossible to have any serious arguments with the NDP without arguing personally with the president.

The NDP program, adopted at its constituent congress in December 1978, signaled the triumph of the ideological views of the class alliance constituting the Sadat regime's social base. It was a complete departure from all of the basic documents of the 1952 revolution. It is indicative that the NDP program does not even mention the Charter for National Action or the Program of 30 March 1968. The NDP program emphasizes the rejection of nationalization and expropriation, and the government is assigned only the role of "guarantor of social justice." The creation of the NDP led to the denial of the concept of the "alliance of working people." The revolutionary-democratic stage of Egypt's

sociopolitical development came to an end. In spite of all its weak points, this concept had given progressive forces moral and legal grounds to oppose government measures serving the interests of parasitical social strata. Of course, the Charter for National Action and the Program of 30 March 1968 also spoke of the need to eradicate conflicts between classes, but they stipulated that this would be made possible only by the elimination of exploitative classes, and not by reconciliation with them.

Socialism--and the Sadat regime continued to declare the construction of socialism as its goal--began to be interpreted as nothing more than a specific system of social insurance and free education and medical care. Austrian "socialism" and the "socialism" which existed in Sweden and England (under Labor governments) were held up as models. The regime's ideologists coined the term "Sadat's socialism" ("ishtirakiat el-Sadat").<sup>22</sup> It was supposed to underscore the difference between Sadat's "humane socialism" and Nasir's "violent socialism." Sadat openly discarded the basic documents of the Egyptian revolution. "The charter and the program of 30 March," he said, "are nothing other than explanatory notes. They are outdated and we have no more need for them."<sup>23</sup>

An entire new current, which could be described as unprincipled conformist pragmatism, made its appearance in Egyptian culture and ideology. The intensive manipulation of public opinion in support of the regime's new aims began. Sadat's propaganda was supposed to eradicate Egyptian public opposition to the policy of Israel and the United States. On the pretext of a struggle against imported ideas and the defense of Egyptian spiritual values, Egyptian society was gradually isolated from the Arab national liberation struggle and the revolutionary process.

The "protection of the individual" against government "oppression" was a prominent theme in the ideological brainwashing of the Egyptians. It was an integral part of the anticommunist campaign which was waged constantly in Egypt throughout A. Sadat's term in office. The president himself repeatedly stressed that "it is impossible to believe in a people with no beliefs"<sup>24</sup> and that he was fully determined to "turn Egypt into a stronghold against communism."<sup>25</sup>

The active use of extreme measures and the passage of laws and adoption of government acts by means of unconstitutional "popular referendums," bypassing the legislative acts and political institutions of government, were distinctive features of the Sadat form of government in the 1970's. Realizing that the prosecution of political and ideological opponents in the courts at a time when "democracy" was "flourishing" in the country would not enhance his prestige as a "liberal" and "champion of democracy," Sadat coined the term "moral responsibility," which should, he alleged, be placed above the constitutional responsibility of citizens. This thesis formed the basis of the law on the defense of social peace and national unity and the "law on vice," which secured the right to prosecute those who opposed the official point of view and even those who merely disagreed with it. In the last years of Sadat's rule (1978-1981), unions of journalists, engineers and attorneys were disbanded on the basis of these "laws."

The "supremacy of the law" declared by A. Sadat actually took the form of an unconcealed personal dictatorship. In an attempt to restrain the headlong growth of opposition to his domestic and foreign policy, Sadat said that he no longer intended to adhere to the principles of his own announced policy of "liberalization and democratization"; in a policy statement in the National Assembly, he declared: "Democratic cliques can do more harm than a dictatorship."<sup>26</sup>

The collapse of the "controlled democracy" provided additional proof of the Sadat regime's historic impasse. The regime's attempts to establish closer relations with the local bourgeoisie and foreign capital and the redirection of Egyptian foreign political and economic relations toward the West promoted the introduction of pluralism into the political system, but the authoritarian nature of Sadat's regime categorically precluded pluralism in any form. Deep-seated conflicts broke out between the Sadat leadership and much of the national Egyptian bourgeoisie in the production sphere; this segment of the bourgeoisie, wanting a free market economy, advocated the kind of parliamentary system that would give it access to real power.

Whereas Nasir's paternalism of the 1950's and 1960's was intended primarily to improve conditions for the Egyptian laboring public, the purpose of the social alliance announced by A. Sadat in the 1970's was objectively contrary to the fundamental interests of broad segments of the Egyptian population. The inability and reluctance of this alliance to solve the country's urgent socio-economic problems, accomplish the democratic development of society and conduct an independent foreign policy line consistent with Egypt's national interests predetermined the transitory nature of the Sadat regime and of its main socio-economic concepts. We could say that Sadat himself was the victim of the social friction engendered by his entire policy line.

The new Egyptian leadership was apparently more aware than the previous one of the danger of glaring social contrasts. One of its first steps was the announcement of a "fight against corruption" and "for the restoration of social justice." The political motives behind this announcement coincided with the urgent economic need to limit the activities of the parasitical capital that was inhibiting the development of productive sectors of the national economy.

This tendency has been countered by another, reflecting the anxiety and caution of the pro-Sadat forces retaining their leading positions in the main government institutions. These groups praise every aspect of Sadat's policy, assert that Sadat's views were 10 years ahead of those of his contemporaries, allege that he gave Egypt international prestige, etc.

At first, it might appear that there is something new in the ideology of the country's ruling forces. A draft document published by President H. Mubarak, "The Ideological Framework of the National Democratic Party,"<sup>27</sup> underscores, in contrast to previous NDP programs, the importance of the Egyptian people's revolutionary gains of the 1950's and 1960's--that is, the Nasir period. The document mentions the Charter and the Program of 30 March 1968. Although Sadat's period of rule is still described as a continuation of the July revolution of 1952, the events of 15 May 1971 (Sadat's victory in the struggle for power with a group of Nasir's supporters, headed by A. Sabri and

S. Gomah--A. K.) are no longer described as "the May revolution, equal in importance to the 1952 revolution," but much more modestly as a "corrective movement." With a view to the recent increase in the activity of extremist Muslim groups, which have accused the regime of departing from the basic canons and principles of Islam, of corruption and of servility to the West and to Israel, the "Ideological Framework" discusses Islam more extensively as the main influence in legislation and the formation of the Egyptian view of the world. In the sphere of foreign policy, statements are made about the need for "struggle to maintain peace throughout the world" and more definite statements are made about the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs. A fundamental characteristic of the new program is the absence of any mention of Sadat's anti-Soviet actions--such as the actions he took when he deported Soviet military experts from Egypt and broke the Soviet-Egyptian treaty on friendship--which were extolled as important stages in the country's development in previous policy-planning documents.

Mubarak's rejection of the previous government's more odious methods relaxed domestic political friction considerably, but there is certainly no reason to believe that the country is on the threshold of great changes. The deep-seated socioeconomic and political causes of the crisis in the ARE still exist. The leadership has never announced a new orientation in any area of national life, and Mubarak's disagreement with certain aspects of his predecessor's policy line has not evolved into a qualitatively new concept or integral program of action envisaging the eradication of the existing sociopolitical system or the institution of measures for the redistribution of national income and the democratization of public life.

The new leadership speaks of adherence to its "own style, differing from Sadat's and Nasir's."<sup>28</sup> It is still too early for anything more than the acknowledgement that the regime is adapting to the changing domestic political and social processes in Egyptian society, relying primarily on the same personnel and operating within the framework of the same concepts. In spite of the declared desire for constructive cooperation with the opposition, the leadership has stubbornly refused to satisfy its collective demands for democratic elections to the Advisory Council, National Assembly and local government institutions, which would secure the fair representation of opposition parties in them.<sup>29</sup> The refusal to democratize the political system is directed primarily against the NDP's most influential rival, the New Wafd Party, which was able, despite government resistance, to resume its activities by the authority of an appellate court. The earlier laws, passed in Sadat's time, on states of emergency and the fight against "subversive activity," however, are still in force.

The first general elections to the ARE National Assembly under H. Mubarak were held in May 1984. Official news organs portrayed them as a "new step into a new era." It is true that the atmosphere of the elections was distinguished by greater tolerance on the part of the government than during the previous elections of 1979 under A. Sadat. The outcome of the elections, however, attested indisputably to the restrictive provisions of the law on elections; the ruling party was able to prevail over all of its political opponents without any trouble. After regrouping its forces considerably, the NDP received around 75 percent of the vote and 391 of the 448 deputy seats. An 8-percent

barrier kept leftist parties, the National Progressive Party and the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), which were supported by around 600,000 Egyptian voters, from sending even a single deputy to the parliament. The rightwing bourgeois New Wafd Party, however, now has 57 seats in the National Assembly, although it did not receive many more votes than the SLP and NPP (778,000). It is true, however, that when the president exercised his constitutional right to appoint 10 deputies, he chose 4 people from the SLP and 1 from the NPP.

It appears that the system of "controlled democracy," which was energetically practiced under A. Sadat, is also approved in general by the current Egyptian leadership, which, as events in the nation's domestic political life over the last 3 years have proved, permits the expression of opposition views, but only within strictly defined limits.

Apparently, the new leadership is trying to do everything possible to keep the opposition from influencing the particular social strata that it expects to constitute the regime's basis of support. This indicates a desire to consolidate the bourgeois class as a whole and reconcile differences between its individual segments.

The same can be said of the regime's proposed model of social development. Under the conditions of the continued dominance of exploitative social groups and bourgeois political institutions, it is actually urging Egypt to continue along the capitalist road.

Although the political structure and developmental prospects of the country have remained largely the same, the government has changed the style and general tone of public statements, and this has created the impression of something new and has engendered hopes for change. It is unlikely, however, that Egypt will be able to overcome the after-effects of its political and economic crisis without a radical revision of the directions the country took in the 1970's.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A feddan is equal to 0.42 hectares.
2. I. P. Ivanova, "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo Ob'yedinennoy Arabskoy Respubliki. 1952-1965" [Agriculture in the United Arab Republic. 1952-1965], Moscow, 1970, pp. 71-72.
3. J. 'Abd al-Nasir, "A View of Political Activity," Cairo, 1965, p. 81 (in Arabic).
4. A. el-Sadat, "In Search of Identity," Cairo, 1978, p. 285 (in Arabic).
5. D. F. Paldi, "Sadat's Challenge," Cairo, 1977, p. 52 (in Arabic).
6. On 28 March 1955, J. al-Nasir formulated the six principles of the Egyptian revolution: 1) the eradication of imperialism; 2) the eradication of

feudalism; 3) the destruction of capitalist monopolies and their political coercion; 4) the establishment of social justice; 5) the creation of a strong national army; 6) the establishment of a truly democratic system.

7. AL AKHBAR, 14 March 1976.
8. F. Seraguddin, "Why a New Party Is Needed," Cairo, 1977 (in Arabic).
9. According to THE FINANCIAL TIMES, by the end of 1978 the General Organization for Arab and Foreign Investments had authorized the construction of facilities with a total cost of 4.3 billion dollars; the proportion accounted for by private investors from the United States was only 16 million dollars, and the figure was even lower for other Western countries (THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 30 August 1979).
10. A. el-Sadat, "October Document," Cairo, 1974 (in Arabic).
11. AL AKHBAR, 9 August 1974.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. AL AHRAM, 12 October 1974.
15. "Resolution of the General ASU National Congress. 22-25 July 1975," Cairo, 1975 (in Arabic).
16. AL AKHBAR, 25 January 1976.
17. AT TALIA, 1976, No 3.
18. AL AHRAM, 30 August 1974.
19. AT TALIA, 1975, No 3.
20. A. Seifaddaula, "Parties and the Problem of Democracy in Egypt," Beirut, 1979, p 19 (in Arabic).
21. AL GARIDA AR RASMIYA, 7 July 1977.
22. A. Amin, "Sadat's Socialism," AL AHRAM, 8 February 1974.
23. AL GOUMHURIYA, 7 June 1977.
24. AL MUSTAQBAL, 24 June 1978.
25. A. Iskander, "The Battle Between the Right and the Left in Egyptian Culture," Beirut, 1978, p 100 (in Arabic).

26. AL AHRAM, 6 September 1981.
27. MAYU, 14 February 1983.
28. AL AHRAM, 6 March 1983.
29. In 1983 a new election law was passed, substituting a proportional system for the majority vote. This new law, however, instituted a restrictive quota: A party which receives less than 8 percent of the vote has no right to a seat in elected bodies; independent candidates cannot run for election and must affiliate themselves with some party.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### CONFLICT OVER SECULAR VS. ISLAMIC ORIENTATION OF TURKISH STATE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 25-33

[Article by D. Ye. Yeremeyev: "Islam and the Political Struggle in Present-Day Turkey"]

[Excerpts] Turkey is a Muslim country: Islam is the religion of 99 percent of the population.<sup>1</sup> The Republic of Turkey, however, is a secular state: The Kemalist reforms of the 1920's and 1930's separated Islam from politics and freed education of Islam's influence. The Kemalists declared secularism (or laicism) to be one of the main principles of their domestic policy.<sup>2</sup>

Laicism, however, is certainly not tantamount to atheism. The Kemalists did not oppose religion as such, but considered it to be the personal affair of each individual. Mosques were not closed. Religious festivals remained official national holidays (for example, Seker Bayram and Kurban Bayram). Kemal and his followers tried to break only the religious bonds which, in their opinion, stood in the way of progress. In essence, the principle of laicism took the form of government control over Islam.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, the consequences of the laicist policy had atheistic repercussions. New generations grew up without experiencing the permeating influence of Islam. Many Kemalist leaders displayed negative feelings about religion in their daily behavior. Kemal Ataturk himself did not go to the mosque, did not pray five times daily and did not fast. His authority naturally influenced the outlook of the younger generation. This is why the secularist reforms led to the acceptance of atheistic ideas by many intellectuals, young workers and students.

But laicism did not totally destroy Islam's influence in the country. The overwhelming majority of Turks--peasants, craftsmen and petty merchants--retained their beliefs. And the Kemalists had to depart from laicism in some respects. For example, in the army they retained the institution of the military mullahs because the soldiers were young peasants who were used to praying five times a day and joining in communal Friday prayers. Furthermore, members of the civilian clergy--mufti and urban imams--became salaried civil servants. This put them under the government's control, but it also signified a departure from laicism: Religious functionaries were part of the government. An exception was made for rural imams, who were still chosen by their

"parishioners" and did not have the status of civil servants, but their appointments were approved by the regional mufti. They received a salary from the rural community, and not from the government.

The main reason for the tenacity of Islamic beliefs in the minds of the majority of Turks, the reason for the increased influence of Islamic ideas on the ideological and political struggle in Turkey in the last three decades, is that social and economic conditions in the Republic of Turkey still allowed Islam to influence sociopolitical affairs.

In the eastern provinces, in spite of the prohibitions, there are Muslim sects and peasants enmeshed in an intricate network of Islamic biases, just as they were in the Turkey of the sultans. In areas controlled by landowners and sheikhs (the landowner and sheikh are often one and the same person, and in regions populated by Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens and other minorities with a tribal structure, he might also be the head of the tribe or clan), the clerics use their sermons about patience, Allah's predetermination of events and divine retribution to justify exploitation. In other words, a social medium for the existence of religion exists in Turkey, in urban as well as rural areas, just as it does in any socially unequal society. The policy of laicism led to only negligible departures from religion among the masses because mass deliverance from religious beliefs is connected primarily with social liberation.

As Turkish historian and sociologist Kemal Karpat noted, the regime established in Turkey after the end of the national liberation struggle was "politically revolutionary but socially conservative."<sup>4</sup> It is true that the Kemalists can be given credit for many progressive changes in Turkey after the rise of the Republican People's Party (RPP), but the Kemalist revolution also had its dark side. The fact is that it did not solve several major problems. There were objective and subjective reasons for this.

The Kemalist revolution was anti-imperialist but certainly not anticapitalist. It was a bourgeois revolution with the aim of establishing capitalism. Even by bourgeois standards, however, it was extremely inconsistent. As a result of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, which had to ally itself with landowners, the revolution did not attain a single of its bourgeois-democratic objectives with the exception of the overthrow of the monarchy and the separation of religion from the state. It did not affect socioeconomic relations and, in particular, did not solve the agrarian problem. Even now, after more than half a century of capitalist development in Turkey, capitalism has not put an end to feudal and patriarchal practices in rural areas. Neither the labor problem nor ethnic problems were solved. Judging by its results, this was a political revolution and not a social one.

The Kemalist reforms, E. Yu. Gasanov says, did not have the necessary socio-economic reinforcement. In this respect, just as in many others, they remained incomplete, and this created favorable conditions for the revival of Muslim reaction.<sup>5</sup>

Kemal Ataturk died in 1938 and rightwing tendencies gradually began to prevail in the RPP leadership.

In July 1945 the government allowed millionaire contractor N. Demirag to found the National Revival Party. The new party's program demanded the renunciation of the principle of laicism. Demirag also announced his opposition to the "Islamic union" of states.<sup>6</sup>

The RPP leaders made substantial concessions to clerics partly because the one-party system was replaced with a multi-party one in 1946. Around 20 bourgeois and bourgeois-landowner parties came into being. Leftist parties were also founded, but the authorities soon accused them of communist propaganda and outlawed them.<sup>7</sup> The parties making up the rightwing opposition began to be used in the struggle for the authority of Islam, despite the fact that Turkish legislation had already prohibited the use of religion for political propaganda purposes back in 1938. Under these circumstances, the RPP began to depart more and more from laicism in the fear of losing the votes of religious Turks in the 1950 elections.

These moves did not help the RPP, however. In the parliamentary elections of 1950 it had to cede authority to the Democrat Party (DP), which had appealed to the religious feelings of voters in its campaign activity. In the 1950's and 1960's, when the DP government headed by Menderes was in power, reactionary forces in the country grew stronger. Many secularist laws were amended or repealed. The government allowed calls for prayer in Arabic and Arabic radio broadcasts of the Koran. The study of Islam became a required subject in elementary and secondary schools. The government financed the publication of religious books and pamphlets. Arabic and Persian words were substituted for all of the neologisms the Kemalists had added to the constitution. Summing up the results of his efforts to "restore" Islam, Menderes declared: "We have saved our religion from persecution. Without paying any attention to revolutionary fanatics, we restored calls for prayer in Arabic. Religion is being taught in the schools. The Koran is being recited on the radio. The Turkish Government was and is Muslim."<sup>10</sup>

The Menderes government used Islam to rationalize a reactionary foreign policy. Turkey's membership in NATO (it officially joined NATO in October 1951-February 1952) was called an "action pleasing to Allah" by the clerics. The creation of such military blocs as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO was sanctified by the banner of "the protection of Islam against communists."

In the second half of the 1950's, after the abrupt deterioration of economic conditions in the country, the DP began to form "domestic front" organizations to oppose progressive forces. Imams took part in their creation.

In 1959 the Muslim clerics called Menderes a saint when he survived an airline disaster. But the DP's days in power were already numbered. On 27 May 1960 the army overthrew the Menderes government. Along with political and economic causes, the Kemalist officers' dissatisfaction with the departure from laicism led to the coup d'etat. Islam's onslaught on laicism was seen by the officers and the intelligentsia as a step backward and as a subversion of the European cultural bases Turkey had already assimilated. A statement by the Committee of National Unity (CNU), a provisional supreme legislative and executive body formed by the military, said that religion would no longer be a weapon in the hands of reactionary politicians. A law was passed to prohibit religious

propaganda for political purposes, even though this prohibition was already recorded in Kemalist legislation. The influential military leaders were not as determined and steadfast as Kemal Ataturk. Furthermore, in 1961, just before a referendum on the new Turkish constitution, the Administration of Religious Affairs published a statement on "Our Constitution from the Islamic Standpoint." It was distributed throughout the country by the CNU<sup>17</sup> and stated that the provisions of the basic law of the Republic of Turkey were not contrary to Muslim principles.

The constitution itself, although it included articles about freedom of religion and prohibited the use of religious feelings for the acquisition of political authority,<sup>18</sup> also reflected a number of the demands of religious circles. For example, control over the observance of the principle of secularism was made the responsibility of the Administration of Religious Affairs, in which the clerics had a great deal of influence.<sup>19</sup> The constitution also permitted "religious education and upbringing." This duality in CNU policy, recorded in the 1961 constitution, favored the revival of Islamist activity.

The ideas of "Islamic socialism," borrowed from the Arab countries but having internal roots as well, became popular in the first half of the 1960's.<sup>21</sup> Proceeding from such Islamic principles as the equality of all Muslims before Allah, the principle of justice (adalet), the elective status of the head of the religious community (imamat), the charitable tax (zakat), alms (sadaqat), the prohibition of usury (riba), the communal property of the Muslim community (awqaf) and others, the supporters of these ideas tried to prove that Islam was essentially socialist. This theory, however, was not entirely successful in Turkey. It was resisted by progressive groups and reactionary clerics. As a result, by the end of the 1960's the prevailing Islamist current was the extreme Right. It turned out that the rightwing groups had connections with imperialist circles and with a reactionary pan-Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, with a diversified international network.<sup>22</sup>

In 1965 the Justice Party (JP) won the elections to the Majlis. It became the RPP's main rival in the 1960's and 1970's. Much of JP policy was inherited from the DP, which was outlawed after the 1960 coup and expressed the interests of the grand bourgeoisie and landowners. The JP owed its election victory primarily to the millions of religious voters, as it had declared itself the protector of their religious convictions. During the campaign, the JP leaders ostentatiously interrupted their speeches for prayer. They promised the rural population "a mosque for each village" and they used their connections with local imams and sheikhs to win support for their party.<sup>23</sup> After 1965 Islam continued to win new victories over laicism. In the second half of the 1960's Turkey was the scene of political events fundamentally inconsistent with laicism: Two parties which openly declared Islam to be their ideological platform were founded--the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the National Order Party (NOP). The NAP was an ultra-rightwing, nationalist-chauvinistic party with a platform based on the ideals of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.

The leader of the NAP, retired Colonel A. Turkes, who had been tried for pan-Turkic propaganda in 1944, advocated the restoration of Islam's role in sociopolitical affairs. He asserted, contrary to all historical facts, that

"Islam is not to blame for the underdevelopment of the Turkish nation"<sup>26</sup> and insisted that the younger generation should be brought up "in accordance with the spiritual values of the Muslim Turk"<sup>27</sup> and that "the laboratories of technical institutes and natural science departments should open onto the corridors of theological academies."<sup>28</sup> Pointing out the economic difficulties and social contrasts engendered by the development of capitalism in the country, A. Turkes wrote: "I am not offering the Turkish nation a petty democracy, an order in which rights are flouted by graft and corruption, a freedom leaving no room for morality, or an economy promoting usury and speculation. I am suggesting a return to Turkish consciousness and pride, to Islamic morals and virtues, to a struggle against poverty, to competition under equal conditions, to unity and fraternity--in short, we must take the road of truth and justice, Allah's road."<sup>29</sup>

On the political level, the NAP began to persecute leftist forces. Using the pretext of a struggle against communism, militarized NAP detachments began to attack student and worker demonstrations, organize pogroms in universities and the editorial offices of progressive publications and murder democratic professors, journalists, union activists and politicians. People in Turkey justifiably christened the NAP a fascist party. Its social base was made up of declasse elements, people from the petty and middle bourgeoisie and some young people.

The second party, the NOP, openly advocated not only the restoration of Islam's role in Turkish sociopolitical affairs, as the NAP did, but also a return to an Islamic state. In other words, this party declared war on the foundations of the secular republic the Kemalists had established. Although the NOP did not use the word "socialism," it based its discussions on Islamic principles such as the adalet, imamat, zakat, waqf and others, just as the "Islamic socialists" did, condemned the brutality of capitalist exploitation ("all of us are Muslim brothers"), criticized the excessive power of foreign capital ("giaour capital") and opposed cooperation with the Common Market--the "giaour offspring." Its platform promised the people "universal prosperity through the revival of Islam."<sup>33</sup> Its social base consisted primarily of the backward segments of the peasantry, the clergy<sup>34</sup> and part of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, primarily from East Anatolia.

On 12 March 1971 the Turkish generals intervened in political affairs and ousted the government of S. Demirel, the leader of the JP. The reason for the intervention was the government's inability to cope with the increasingly severe political crisis and mounting economic difficulties. The country was shaken by strikes and antigovernment demonstrations. Terrorist actions were committed more frequently by ultra-rightwing groups, including NAP detachments, and ultra-leftist organizations. The new governments (first N. Erim's and then F. Melen's) the generals put in power on the pretext of a "struggle against terrorism and anarchy" dealt a blow to leftist and progressive forces: They outlawed the Turkish Labor Party, the Federation of Social Democratic Societies, the teachers' union and other organizations, closed down a number of progressive publications and pushed undemocratic constitutional amendments through the Majlis. But the fascist NAP was not outlawed. The NOP was outlawed: On 21 May 1971 the Constitutional Court ruled that the NOP program

contradicted the constitutional principle of the secular state. Therefore, after military intervention, there was a tendency, just as there had been in 1960, toward the stronger observance of the principle of laicism. Soon afterward, everything "went back to normal."

By the end of the 1970's the political struggle in Turkey had been exacerbated to the extreme. This was mainly a result of extraordinary economic and financial difficulties. The GNP growth rate dropped to 3.5 percent in 1978 and 2.2 percent in 1979. The foreign trade deficit reached 2.8 billion dollars and the foreign debt totaled 18 billion dollars. The Turkish lira was devalued several times: by 43.6 percent in 1979 and by almost 90 percent in 1980.<sup>38</sup> Food prices rose 160-180 percent between 1978 and the middle of 1980.<sup>39</sup> All of this was primarily a result of foreign economic dependence on the Western powers and of excessive military spending (Turkey still maintains an army of half a million men in NATO, ranking second after the United States).

Under these conditions, workers, employees and other segments of the Turkish society who had suffered the most from the deterioration of economic conditions intensified the struggle for their rights; leftist and democratic forces became more active. The government responded with repressive actions, but these only escalated friction. The NAP launched mass-scale terrorist actions. The persecution of progressive organizations and individuals was accompanied by massacres of workers, employees and students. Between 1978 and 1980, 5,241 people died and 14,152 were wounded or crippled.<sup>40</sup> With this terror, the NAP hoped, on the one hand, to intimidate leftist forces and, on the other, to demonstrate bourgeois democracy's inability to secure law and order in the country and to thereby prove the need for a dictatorship. The NAP used religion in the organization of terrorist actions.

It was in this atmosphere that the generals again intervened in Turkish politics. The government of S. Demirel was removed on 12 September 1980. All power was assumed by a National Security Council, made up of five generals and headed by Chief of Staff Kenan Evren. On 22 September 1980 Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu, a retired admiral, formed a new government. The military authorities declared their fidelity to the principles of Kemalism and condemned "reactionary and other extreme ideological doctrines" and the use of religious differences in the political struggle.<sup>41</sup> All political parties were disbanded; the National Salvation Party and Nationalist Action Party were singled out for criticism for their use of Islam for political purposes. Religious propaganda was restricted considerably. The government declared its intention to "defend the principle of laicism," noting that "the Administration of Religious Affairs and religious leaders must not become involved in political disputes and fall prey to political influence."<sup>42</sup> At the same time, the program tried to dissociate itself from atheism by appealing for the training of "enlightened clerics as followers of Ataturk."<sup>43</sup> The 1982 constitution contained a statement about compulsory instruction in the fundamentals of religion in elementary schools (Article 24).

In the 1980's the Islamic factor has also been playing a more important role in Turkish foreign policy: The new government has energetically used the ideals of Muslim solidarity for convergence with Muslim countries. This policy has been pursued since 1974, when the country joined the Islamic Conference.<sup>44</sup>

Turkey is striving for convergence with the Arab countries in the hope of increased financial assistance, shipments of oil (its own petroleum industry covers only one-fourth of its needs) and increased exports to these countries, including the migration of manpower (in recent years most of the emigre Turkish workers have moved to these countries as a result of the unemployment in Western Europe).

It is also indicative that the latest convention of the administrators of the Islamic Development Bank was held in Istanbul in May 1982. The introductory speech was presented by the head of the Turkish Government, K. Evren, who specifically said: "Relations with Arab and Muslim countries constitute an integral and important part of our foreign policy.... The future of our countries will depend on our efforts to carry out our wishes for joint development, in which our financial, technical and human resources will be united."<sup>45</sup> It is true that between 1975 and 1981 Turkey received just slightly over 320 million dollars in credit from this bank,<sup>46</sup> but even this financial assistance is extremely important to Turkey. Turkey has also taken a positive stand on the creation of a "Muslim common market."<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, the domestic political aspect of the relationship between Islam and the state has recently been combined with the foreign political and foreign economic aspects of this problem in Turkey.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The overwhelming majority of Turkish Muslims are Hanafite Sunnites. The Shiites constitute a minority--around 10 percent of the population.
2. S. Aykut, "Kamalizm (C. H. Partisi programinin izahisi)" [Kemalism. An Explanation of the RPP Platform], Istanbul, 1936.
3. Bekir Yusuf, "The Effect of Islam on Sociopolitical Affairs in the Republic of Turkey," author's precis of a candidate's dissertation, Moscow, 1973, pp 20-21.
4. K. Karpat, "Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System," Princeton, 1959, p 51.
5. E. Yu. Gasanova, "Islam and the Principle of Laicism in Present-Day Turkey," "Religiya i obshchestvennaya mysль' stran Vostoka" [Religion and Social Thought in the Eastern Countries], Moscow, 1974, p 105.
6. D. I. Vdovichenko, "Bor'ba politicheskikh partiy v Turtsii (1944-1965 gg.)" [The Political Party Struggle in Turkey (1944-1965)], Moscow, 1967, pp 32-33.
7. Communist propaganda is prohibited by law in Turkey and is punishable by imprisonment. The Communist Party has been proscribed since 1925.
10. N. F. Kisakurek, "A Message to the Prime Minister," BUYUK DOGU, 16 February 1951.

16. T. P. Dadashev, "Prosveshcheniye v Turtsii v noveysheye vremya (1923-1960)" [Education in Contemporary Turkey (1923-1960)], Moscow, 1972, pp 104-105, 115.
17. Bekir Yusuf, Op. cit., pp 38-42.
18. Article 19 of the constitution envisaged freedom of thought and religious liberty, as well as non-intervention by religion in social, political and economic affairs and the legal system ("Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasalari," Istanbul, 1982, p 76).
19. E. Yu. Gasanova, Op. cit., p 109.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p 111.
23. D. I. Vdovichenko, Op. cit., p 245.
26. A. Turkes, "Turkiye'nin meseleleri" [Turkey's Problems], Istanbul, 1969, p 7.
27. Ibid., p 10.
28. Ibid., p 27.
29. Ibid., p 26.
33. F. Bozbeyli, "Turkiye'de siyasi partilerin ekonomik ve sosyal gorucleri--belgeler: parti programlari" [Party Platforms as Documents of the Economic and Social Policy of Turkish Parties], Istanbul, 1970, pp 395, 432.
34. E. Tezic, "100 soruda siyasi partiler" [100 Questions About Political Parties], Istanbul, 1976, p 337.
38. G. I. Starchenkov, "Turkey on the Threshold of the 1980's," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1980, No 10, p 14; PRAVDA, 14 December 1980.
39. G. I. Starchenkov, Op. cit., p 15.
40. MILLIYET, 13 September 1980, p 7.
41. Ibid., pp 6-7.
42. Ibid., 26 September 1980, pp 1, 7.
43. Ibid.
44. The next session of the Islamic Conference was held in 1976 in Istanbul, and the Turkish delegation was headed by Foreign Minister I. Caglayangil, member of the JP. In 1978 and 1979 the Turkish delegations were headed by Foreign Minister G. Okcun, member of the RPP ("Turkey Almanac 1980," p 328).

45. CUMHURIYET, 25 May 1982, p 1.
46. Y. Saner, "Turkey Favors Close Ties with Muslim Countries," MILLIYET AKTUALITE, 30 May 1982, p 14.
47. E. Alkin, "The Muslim Common Market," ibid., p 17.

**COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"**  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### ETHIOPIAN METHODS FOR INDOCTRINATING SOCIALISM DESCRIBED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 81-87

[Article by Ye. S. Sherr: "Means and Methods of Disseminating Scientific Socialist Ideas in Ethiopia"]

[Excerpts] All attempts to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideas and the socialist ideology in general were frustrated by the feudal monarchy in Ethiopia prior to the national-democratic revolution of 1974.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Ethiopia's socioeconomic backwardness at that time precluded the existence of soil for the cultivation of these ideas. On the contrary, in spite of the archaic production relations and the complex intermeshing of social structures, including the most backward ones, the exploitation of Ethiopian urban and rural workers reached such extremes and appeared so deformed and "medieval" in comparison to worldwide and Africawide processes that the ideas of social liberation, including the most progressive, found a grateful audience here. The key question in Ethiopia, just as in any other agrarian peasant country, was the land question. The oppressive and brutal treatment of rural workers by the state, the aristocracy, the landowners, the church, local chiefs, bureaucrats and elders maximized friction in rural areas. The small Ethiopian proletariat and the larger urban and rural semiproletariat experienced the oppression of local and foreign exploiters, which was particularly severe under the conditions of underdeveloped social-class relations, the workers' low level of class consciousness and the prohibition of political parties and strikes. Members of ethnic minorities and of religions differing from the government-sanctioned Christian religion had a low status. All of this gave rise to rebellious feelings, class and interethnic conflicts and the spread of socialist ideas. In the Ethiopian society these ideas were disseminated by members of the progressive democratic intelligentsia, which had been growing since the end of World War II.

In an attempt to completely isolate the country from Marxist-Leninist ideas, the feudal monarchic authorities did not allow the public to hear any truthful information about Great October and about socialist construction in the USSR and other countries. As for the isolated and distorted reports published from time to time in the press on the socialist countries, even before the 1974 revolution Ethiopian historian Aleme Eshete noted that people in Ethiopia

"learned about the Bolshevik revolution from Western diplomats, who were anti-Bolsheviks themselves, or from Western conservative publications...with a negative attitude toward the Bolsheviks' Marxist doctrine."<sup>1</sup> Every attempt was made to keep the people from coming into contact with "seditious" ideas: Ruling circles waged a struggle against the "red menace." Dunbar, the British representative in Ethiopia, reported with approval to London that the Ethiopian Government "is watching out for all signs of propaganda and taking resolute action against the propagandists."<sup>2</sup>

In spite of all these actions, public unrest continued to grow and socialist ideas evoked increasingly favorable responses. This was quite vividly reflected in the evolution of the ideology of the revolutionary officers who headed the national-democratic revolution in September 1974. The direct effect of Marxist-Leninist ideas on the ideology of Ethiopian revolutionary democrats was demonstrated after the triumph of the revolution, in 1975, when the military authorities began to pursue a socialist policy, supported by broad segments of the laboring masses. The Ethiopian leadership encountered many problems in its application of Marxist-Leninist ideas about the socialist orientation to the specific realities of its country. Considerable difficulties were created not only by rightwing counterrevolutionary forces openly opposing the radical aims of the revolution, but also by the ultra-leftist opposition made up of members of the petty bourgeoisie and separatist nationalists.<sup>3</sup>

All of this required the clarification of the ideological premises and objectives of the revolution. The publication of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) on 20 April 1976 proved that the Ethiopian leadership was coping successfully with these problems. The program was the first official government document stating that the executive body of the revolution, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), accepted scientific socialism as the ideology of the revolution and that its current aims were the creation of a vanguard workers party and the transformation of Ethiopia into a popular-democratic state.

In the middle of 1976 the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA) was established to mobilize the workers for a revolutionary struggle, to disseminate the Marxist-Leninist ideology among them and to prepare for the creation of a vanguard workers party.<sup>4</sup> This work became particularly extensive after the Commission of the Progressive Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) was created in June 1980.<sup>5</sup> The decree on the creation of COPWE said that its functions would include "the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, free of revisionism, among the masses through study groups, discussion forums, government and mass organizations and the mass media."<sup>6</sup>

The dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the creation of a broad stratum of confirmed fighters for the new society were indisputably promoted by the so-called discussion forums first organized for workers, peasants and employees in government and public organizations in 1976. These were essentially political enlightenment seminars where aspects of ideology, policy and revolutionary practice were discussed once or twice a week. By January 1983 there were 13,000 such forums in the country.<sup>7</sup> The forums teach revolutionary activists the principles of scientific socialism and help them overcome the

influence of petty bourgeois theories and slogans from the West, which were advanced by nationalist elements during the first years of the revolution. The subject matter of these seminars is chosen by the ideological department of the COPWE Central Committee. During the 1980-1983 period the subjects discussed in the forums included capitalist political economics, trends in the contemporary anti-imperialist struggle, American imperialism's role in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, the historical experience of the CPSU, the results of the Second COPWE Congress, etc.

After COPWE was founded, intensive work began for the establishment and reinforcement of mass public organizations under its leadership. The policy statements of the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association (REWA) and Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association (REYA) say that their main areas of activity are the struggle for the implementation of the NDRP, the mastery of the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist ideology and active participation in the construction of a new society. COPWE is also conducting a great deal of political work in such nationwide public organizations as the All-Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU) and the All-Ethiopian Farmers' Association (MEIGEMA).

The radio, the press and television are playing an important role in the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist information. Aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory and the common practices of communist, workers and revolutionary-democratic parties are regularly discussed in newspapers, magazines and the broadcasts of Radio Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia. For several years, for example, THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD, ALDIS ZEMEN and other newspapers have been publishing articles by local and foreign authors under the heading of "Opinions and Views on Questions of Marxist-Leninist Theory." The members of the editorial boards of these publications regularly look into the experience of party press organs in the socialist countries and take part in the discussions of the problems of the international workers movement organized by the editors of PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA.

The COPWE publishing and book trade agency, "Kuraz" ("Lamp"), founded in November 1980, has contributed much to the political enlightenment of the Ethiopian workers. It now has around 30 stores of its own in various cities. The public is extremely interested in sociopolitical literature. According to the testimony of American journalists L. and D. Ottaway, when the first store selling books by the founders of Marxism-Leninism opened in Addis Ababa in early 1976, it was "literally besieged by customers, and each new load of books was sold in an instant."<sup>13</sup>

In 1982 the State Committee of the USSR for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade signed an agreement with the "Kuraz" agency on cooperation in the publication, translation, editing and Ethiopian distribution of socio-political literature in the Amharic and English languages. "Kuraz" issued 13 books in 1981 and 17 in 1982.<sup>14</sup> The average edition was 15,000 copies. In 1983 the agency published its first books in Tigrinya.

In conjunction with Soviet organizations and publishing houses in other socialist countries, "Kuraz" regularly holds book fairs in various parts of the country and participates in book exhibits abroad. Representatives of "Kuraz" have participated in three international book fair-exhibits in Moscow

since 1979. The study of the experience of their colleagues from the countries of the socialist community in publishing and the book trade is helping the Ethiopian organizations improve their work.

Ethiopia receives large shipments of Marxist-Leninist literature in the Amharic and English languages from the Soviet Union. It receives many of them for free. For example, COPWE received 300,000 copies of various Marxist-Leninist books as a gift from the CPSU in December 1982 and again in July 1983.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet "Progress" and APN publishing houses have made a definite contribution to the distribution of sociopolitical literature in the Amharic and English languages in Ethiopia. These publications give the Ethiopian reader a knowledge of the experience in socialist construction, the development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, etc. All of these publications are quite popular in the country.

The WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (the Amharic edition of the magazine PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA) has been published in Amharic since 1980 in Addis Ababa. Public organizations and some government establishments--the Ministry of Culture, REWA, the Commission on Tourism and others--have their own press organs which publicize the ideas of national socialism in a form accessible to the masses and elucidate matters pertaining to the advance toward socialism.

The Yekatt'66 Political School,<sup>17</sup> established by a PMAC decree in April 1976, has played a significant role in the ideological and political indoctrination of the Ethiopian workers, especially administrative personnel and the middle link of government employees. In the 8 years of its existence, the school has been attended by around 10,000 people. In 1981-1982 alone, 2,845 COPWE functionaries and activists from various establishments and mass public organizations attended advanced ideological training courses in the political school.<sup>18</sup> Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC and COPWE highly commended the work of the political school in a speech at the Second COPWE Congress. This work, he stressed, should secure not only the ideological unity of the members of the future party, indoctrinated in the spirit of the communist ideology, but also its effective organizational activity.<sup>19</sup>

Academic institutions have been assigned important duties in the political enlightenment of various segments of the population. The PMAC and COPWE have taken considerable pains to reorganize the entire educational system to meet the requirements of the socialist orientation. Academic curricula were redesigned. The fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political economy are now taught in all VUZ's. A philosophy department was established at the University of Addis Ababa in 1977. University graduates with this major now constitute the nucleus of the instructors teaching students the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

The structure and content of liberal arts textbooks are undergoing radical changes. In 1979 and 1980 the Ministry of Education issued new history textbooks for high schools. The history textbook for the 9th grade included sections on utopian socialism, German classical philosophy, the origins of scientific communism and information about the life and work of the founders

of Marxism. In textbooks for the 10th, 11th and 12th grades, modern and contemporary history is studied from a class, Marxist-Leninist standpoint, in contrast to the approach taken in textbooks published prior to the revolution.

A special broadcasting network has been organized in the country to serve the educational needs of adults and college students. By summer 1982, in addition to the main radio stations in Addis Ababa, Asmara and Harer, there were 11 stations broadcasting programs for students in work-study programs, schools and VUZ's, including social science programs. Around 20,000 radios were distributed to the population for the transmission of these programs. The programs are broadcast 10 hours a day in the languages of four local nationalities (Amharic, Oromo, Wolayta and Tigrinya) and in English.<sup>21</sup>

Seminars and advanced training courses in the social sciences are conducted for schoolteachers and VUZ instructors. A seminar on aspects of the "Marxist-Leninist orientation" of students was held in Addis Ababa in October 1982 and was attended by 250 directors and assistant directors of schools in the capital.<sup>22</sup>

The PMAC and COPWE are doing much to indoctrinate the laboring masses in the spirit of the new, revolutionary culture. The nationwide campaign launched in July 1979 to eradicate illiteracy and to raise the workers' political consciousness in addition to teaching them how to read and write established the necessary basis for this. According to preliminary data, over 7 million people were involved in work-study courses throughout the country; the level of literacy rose from 7 percent to 53 percent within 3 years; in 1983 classes were already being taught in the 15 languages of the country's main nationalities.<sup>23</sup>

Assessing the initial results of this colossal job, Mengistu Haile Mariam said: "We and our friends are proud of the fact that we have been able to free more than 10 million adult citizens from the trap of illiteracy within a short time. This is an important contribution to the implementation of our extensive plans for the training of qualified personnel for the country. It is also obvious that the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideas during the course of the successful campaign to eradicate illiteracy as well as in the system of general education is the prerequisite for the development of the spiritual and physical strength of a revolutionary people."<sup>24</sup>

The decisions of COPWE Central Committee plenums and, in particular, of the Second COPWE Congress in January 1983, where a decree was adopted on a transition to the final phase of the creation of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party, represent important milestones in the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology.<sup>25</sup> Just before the Second COPWE Congress, rallies, seminars and symposiums were held in all administrative regions to explain the objectives and role of the new Marxist-Leninist political organization. Another series of agitation and propaganda undertakings followed the second congress. Congress papers were widely discussed in forums. At the beginning of 1983 a campaign was launched for voluntary overtime work without pay in support of congress decisions. The reorganization and reinforcement of mass public organizations during the period between the Second COPWE Congress and the constituent party congress scheduled for fall 1984 helped to strengthen the commission's contacts with the masses, increase the public's political awareness and promote further involvement in the revolutionary process.

The economic and foreign policy line of the PMAC and COPWE is a line of socialist orientation. The eradication of the feudal monarchy, the collectivization of the main means of production, the restriction of foreign and national capital, the establishment of the bases of a planned economy and the creation of a material and technical base on a higher level should all constitute the foundation for Ethiopia's transition to socialist construction. The acceptance of the ideology of scientific socialism, the creation of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist workers party, the declaration of a popular-democratic republic and a progressive anti-imperialist foreign policy line combined with strong solidarity with the countries of the socialist community represent tangible elements of Ethiopia's advancement along its chosen path of socialist orientation.

The study of the experience of the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community, cooperation with them in ideological matters and party organizational affairs and their assistance in the training of Ethiopian national personnel have done much to promote the Marxist-Leninist ideological indoctrination of the Ethiopian workers. Hundreds of Ethiopian citizens have graduated from Soviet VUZ's and have undergone training in various courses and work assignments.

After the CPSU and COPWE signed an agreement on cooperation on 12 October 1982, there was a particularly lively exchange of delegations. Many officials from COPWE Central Committee departments and the commission's provincial organizations have visited the Soviet Union in recent years to study the CPSU experience in party organizational matters. Several delegations representing public organizations, workers control committees, urban associations and peasant associations have also visited the USSR.

When Mengistu Haile Mariam spoke of the great importance of the CPSU's experience to revolutionary Ethiopia during the final stage of the creation of a vanguard workers party when he was the guest of honor at a luncheon during his visit to Moscow on 29 March 1984, he said: "The present contacts and exchange of experience between COPWE and the CPSU are establishing favorable conditions for the work of the future Ethiopian workers party."<sup>30</sup>

Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation in the sphere of ideology is also being developed in other ways. For example, it has become an Ethiopian tradition to commemorate important events in the history of the Soviet country and the CPSU. On these days, reports on current political issues are presented at public meetings, brigades of Soviet and Ethiopian speakers tour the provinces, and scientific conferences are organized.

The depth and thoroughness with which the Marxist-Leninist view of the world is being assimilated in Ethiopia are attested to by its revolutionary practices, by the scales, maturity, timeliness and scientific validity of its socioeconomic reforms and by their correspondence to the fundamental interests of the laboring masses and the interests of the world revolutionary process.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Aleme Ashete, "Ethiopia and the Bolshevik Revolution. 1917-1935," "African History Conference," Dar-es-Salaam, 1973, p 5.

2. *Ibid.*, p 18.
3. For more detail, see "Sovremennyye problemy i vnesnyaya politika Efiopii" [The Current Problems and Foreign Policy of Ethiopia], Moscow, 1982, pp 25-28, 52-56.
4. "The Roles of POMOA and the Yekatt'66 Political School in the Ethiopian Revolution," Addis Ababa, 1978, pp 9-10, 13.
5. The PMAC decree on the creation of COPWE was published in December 1979. The First (constituent) COPWE Congress was held in June 1980, and the second congress was held in January 1983.
6. "Proclamation No 174 To Provide for the Establishment of COPWE," ch I, art 6 (b), Addis Ababa, 18 December 1979.
7. THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD, 4 January 1983.
13. M. and D. Ottaway, "Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution," N.Y.-London, 1978, p 116.
14. THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD, 18 August, 21 September 1982.
15. *Ibid.*, 16 December 1982, 7 July 1983.
17. "Yekatt" is the Amharic word for February, the month marking the beginning of revolutionary unrest in 1974; the year of 1966 in the Ethiopian calendar corresponds roughly to the European year of 1974.
18. THE ETHIOPIAN HERALD, 4 January 1983.
19. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, 19 May 1982.
22. *Ibid.*, 4 January 1983.
27. *Ibid.*, 20 February 1983.
28. PRAVDA, 30 March 1984.
29. "Documents and Resolutions of the Second COPWE Congress," Addis Ababa, 1983, p 10.
30. PRAVDA, 30 March 1984.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### WESTERN SAHARAN PROBLEM'S ORIGINS, CURRENT STATUS EXAMINED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 96-103

[Article by L. P. Andreyev and N. P. Podgornova: "Western Sahara: The Search for Solutions"]

[Text] The conflict over Western Sahara, which is complicating the situation in the Mediterranean and is escalating tension in the Arabian Sea and Africa, has long been a matter of concern to the international public. Attempts to solve the problem by political means have not produced any positive results as yet. The reason for this can be found in the differing approaches of conflicting parties to the question of Western Sahara's future after the elimination of colonial domination.

Western Sahara--formerly Spanish Sahara--consists of two historically separate regions: Sagui el Hamra in the north and Rio de Oro in the south (its total area is 266,000 square kilometers and its population is around 80,000). It is bordered on the north by Morocco, on the east by Algeria and on the south by Mauritania. In 1884 the territory was seized by Spain; its boundaries were defined in the Spanish-French agreements of 1900, 1904 and 1912 on the division of the French and Spanish zones of influence. The Western Saharan people's struggle against the Spanish and French colonizers also dates back to this time.

It was not until the middle of the 1930's that Spain was able to "tame" the Saharan tribes with France's help. After World War II, however, there was a new wave of the liberation movement. By 1958 the rebels virtually controlled most of Western Sahara, but an expeditionary team sent by France helped to defeat the rebel movement and restore Spanish rule. Western Sahara was declared an "African province" of Spain. In the 1960's other imperialist powers also took an interest in Western Sahara, especially after large deposits of phosphorites and other minerals were discovered there.<sup>1</sup> At that time, Morocco and Mauritania presented historical, geographic and ethnic arguments to make claims on Western Sahara; this seriously slowed down the decolonization process.<sup>2</sup>

The liquidation of the Spanish colonial administration in Western Sahara was discussed several times in the United Nations. On 16 December 1965 the

UN General Assembly asked the Spanish Government to "take all necessary measures without delay" to free Spanish Sahara from colonial domination.<sup>3</sup> In December 1966 the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution confirming the Saharan people's right to self-determination and asking Spain to establish a UN-sponsored referendum "in accordance with the wishes of the native population of Spanish Sahara after consultations with the governments of Mauritania, Morocco and any other interested party"<sup>4</sup> in order to "give the native population of this territory an opportunity to freely exercise its right to self-determination." All subsequent General Assembly resolutions up to 1974 reaffirmed the right of the population of former Spanish Sahara to self-determination and stressed the need for its decolonization without delay.<sup>5</sup> To retain its influence and create the impression of "decolonization," Spain had to engage in maneuvers. In 1967 a local self-government body with consultative functions, the "djemaa," was established in Western Sahara (62 of its 102 members were tribal chiefs and were appointed by the Spanish administration, and 40 were elected by the population).

The question of Western Sahara's future was discussed at tripartite meetings of the leaders of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania in September 1970 and July 1973; President H. Boumediene of Algeria, King Hassan II of Morocco and President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania agreed that the decolonization process should be stepped up and that a UN-sponsored referendum should be held in Western Sahara.

On 4 July 1974 the Spanish Government announced that the territory had been granted autonomy, and on 21 August it announced its intention to hold a referendum there in the first half of 1975 on the question of self-determination. In connection with this, the leaders of Morocco and Mauritania made further claims on the territory in fall 1974, and in December 1974 Hassan II and M. Ould Daddah concluded a fundamental agreement on the partition of Western Sahara after decolonization.<sup>6</sup> In view of the negative attitude of several states, particularly Algeria, toward their plans, Morocco and Mauritania proposed that the question of the ownership of Western Sahara be decided by the World Court.<sup>7</sup> At their insistence, the General Assembly recommended that Spain postpone the referendum until the World Court had reached a decision on the matter.<sup>8</sup> A special UN mission was sent to Western Sahara to study the situation. At that time the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagui el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), which was formed in May 1973 and was fighting against the Spanish colonizers, became more active and demanded that the referendum be held.

On 16 October 1975 the World Court issued an "advisory opinion" after examining all of the materials presented by the sides. It said that in view of the fact that various social and political institutions regulating the native population's way of life and its relations with neighboring countries had existed in Western Sahara prior to its colonization, the territory was not "terra nullius" at the time it was colonized. Since only a few Western Saharan tribes had legal ties with Morocco and Mauritania, which sometimes took the form of vassal dependence, the World Court concluded that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had "territorial sovereignty" over Western Sahara and that this "allows for the implementation of UN resolution 1514 (XV) on

decolonization and the application of the principle of self-determination through the free expression of the wishes of the people of this territory."<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, Morocco interpreted the World Court decision as "evidence of the Moroccan people's right to unite their territories" and took action. In October 1975 the so-called "green march" was organized: 350,000 Moroccan volunteers were supposed to cross the border into Western Sahara. At that time, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania were conducting negotiations, during the course of which the Spanish Government agreed in principle to the "peaceful transfer" of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania.<sup>10</sup> Under these conditions, the "green march" represented a means of exerting pressure on Spain. On 6 November 1975 the marchers crossed the border and advanced to Spanish troop fortifications 10 kilometers within the territory of Western Sahara. Although the Moroccans did not plan to fight the Spanish Army, the situation in the region was complicated to the extreme; the real possibility of an armed conflict arose. The situation in Western Sahara was discussed in the UN Security Council, which published three resolutions on this matter, in which the "concerned and interested" parties were asked to display restraint and not to commit unilateral actions that might complicate the situation.<sup>11</sup> After the Security Council issued its appeal, the marchers returned to their initial position. The threat of an armed conflict between Morocco and Spain was eliminated. On 14 November 1975 a Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement was signed in Madrid on the transfer of Western Sahara by Spain to a provisional Moroccan and Mauritanian administration and on the cessation of the Spanish presence in this territory no later than 28 February 1976. On the same day, Morocco and Mauritania sent their troops into Western Sahara.

After discussing the matter, the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions on Western Sahara, one of which (resolution "A") reflected Algeria's point of view, while the other (resolution "B") reflected Morocco's. Both resolutions acknowledged the Saharan people's right to self-determination, but the first made Spain responsible for the exercise of this right under UN supervision and "after consultations with all concerned and interested parties," while the second assigned this responsibility to the provisional Moroccan-Mauritanian-Spanish administration.<sup>12</sup>

In January 1976 Spain withdrew its troops from Western Sahara, and on 26 February it made an official UN announcement of "the complete cessation of its presence in Western Sahara and the transfer of administrative functions to Morocco and Mauritania."<sup>13</sup> Not long before the last members of the Spanish administration left Western Sahara, the djemaa was quickly convened (only 62 of its 102 members attended the meeting) and approved the Madrid agreement in the presence of the Moroccan and Mauritanian governors and a representative of the Spanish Government.<sup>14</sup> This "approval" was later interpreted as the Saharan people's exercise of the right to self-determination--that is, as a choice in favor of Moroccan and Mauritanian annexation.

The Madrid agreement could not secure a fair and lasting solution to the Saharan problem because it did not consider the opinions of all interested parties. This is why the leaders of the POLISARIO front announced their intention to wage an armed struggle for the liberation of Western Sahara.

Front detachments launched vigorous hostilities against Moroccan and Mauritanian troops.

After condemning the partition of Western Sahara, Algeria supported the POLISARIO front and refused to recognize the Madrid agreement, as a result of which its relations with Morocco and Mauritania were seriously complicated. Disagreements also broke out within the djemaa. On 28 November 1975 some deputies withdrew from the djemaa and formed the Provisional Saharan National Council (PSNC).<sup>15</sup> The friction was increased even more after POLISARIO and the PSNC announced the creation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) on 27 February 1976. Algeria was one of the first to recognize the SDAR, as a result of which Morocco and Mauritania broke off diplomatic relations with Algeria. On 14 April 1976 they signed a convention on the boundary between the two countries in Western Sahara (Sagui el Hamra went to Morocco and Rio de Oro went to Mauritania) and an agreement on cooperation in the economic development of the "returned territories."<sup>16</sup>

In May 1977 a Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement on joint defense was signed, in accordance with which Morocco sent an expeditionary force of 10,000 men to Mauritania.<sup>17</sup>

The continuous hostilities between POLISARIO and the Moroccan and Mauritanian troops seriously escalated tension in the region. The Western powers took advantage of this to strengthen their own positions in Morocco and Mauritania. French and U.S. military cooperation with these countries was expanded considerably. American military shipments to Morocco increased. French instructors trained the rapidly growing Mauritanian Army. French Air Force planes patrolled Mauritania's northern regions from December 1977 to February 1978 and attacked POLISARIO columns several times, inflicting heavy losses on them.

The hostilities required a constant increase in the military expenditures of the sides. According to reports in the foreign press, for example, defense allocations in Morocco in 1976 were more than double the 1975 figure.<sup>18</sup> The country annually spends up to a billion American dollars on national defense, representing around 40 percent of the state budget on the average. In all, by the beginning of 1981 Morocco had spent over 6 billion dollars on military operations in Western Sahara.<sup>19</sup>

Economic conditions soon deteriorated in Mauritania as well. There were domestic political problems in the country. On 10 July 1978 there was a coup d'etat. After several changes of leadership, the new Mauritanian leaders, headed by M. Khouna Ould Haidalla, agreed to negotiations with POLISARIO. On 5 August 1979 Mauritania and POLISARIO signed a peace treaty, in accordance with which Mauritania gave up its territorial claims on Western Sahara and announced its neutrality in the Western Saharan conflict.<sup>20</sup> In response to this, Morocco sent its troops to the former "Mauritanian" part of Western Sahara.

On 21 November 1979, on the initiative of Algeria, Angola, Afghanistan and several other countries, the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming the "inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence" and "the legal nature of their

struggle" to exercise this right. The General Assembly commended the agreement between Mauritania and POLISARIO, "deeply regretted" the escalation of tension in Western Sahara and asked Morocco to "put an end to the occupation" of this territory. The resolution also recommended that the POLISARIO front, representing the people of Western Sahara, "participate fully in the search for a just, lasting and final political solution to the Western Saharan problem in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, OAU and nonaligned countries."<sup>21</sup> The Western Saharan people's right to self-determination and independence was reaffirmed at the 35th, 36th and 37th sessions of the UN General Assembly in 1980-1982, and Morocco and POLISARIO were asked to begin negotiating a final solution to the Western Saharan problem.

The Organization of African Unity has given the Western Saharan problem considerable attention and has discussed it several times. At the 13th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU countries in Addis Ababa (July 1976), a decision was made to hold a special assembly session for the discussion of the Western Saharan problem (the session was not convened). By a decision of the 15th Session of the OAU Assembly in Khartoum (July 1978), a special OAU committee ("committee of sages"), made up of R. Nimeiri (Sudan) as its chairman and J. Nyerere (Tanzania), M. Traore (Mali), O. Obasanjo (Nigeria), F. Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast) and A. Sekou Toure (Guinea) as its other members, was formed to discuss all of the information pertaining to the Western Saharan problem, including the exercise of the right of self-determination.<sup>22</sup> At the 16th Session of the OAU Assembly in Monrovia (July 1979), the committee recommended a cease-fire and the organization of a referendum in Western Sahara. The assembly approved the recommendation and decided to create an OAU committee to define the terms of the referendum and supervise it in conjunction with the United Nations. In December 1979 a committee meeting in Monrovia was attended by the president of Algeria, the foreign minister of Mauritania, the secretary-general of the POLISARIO front and the assistant secretary-general of the United Nations (Morocco and Guinea were not represented at the meeting). The committee asked Morocco to "remove all of its troops and its administration from the region evacuated by Mauritania" and appealed to all of the parties involved in the conflict for "an immediate cease-fire throughout the territory of Western Sahara to create the necessary conditions for a free and just referendum." The committee recommended that the cease-fire be monitored by an "OAU peace-keeping force" and asked the international community to "refrain from taking any action" that might inhibit the OAU committee's search for a peaceful solution.<sup>23</sup> Morocco accused the committee of an "unobjective approach" to the Western Saharan problem and rejected its recommendations.

At the 17th Session of the OAU Assembly in Freetown (July 1980), the SDAR applied for membership in the OAU. During the course of debates in an atmosphere of fierce disagreements, Zimbabwe, Mali and Chad announced their recognition of the SDAR. This raised the total number of OAU countries recognizing the SDAR to 26 (out of 50), securing majority support for the SDAR. The Moroccan delegation issued a vehement protest, alleging that the SDAR was not a sovereign and independent state and that the issue of its membership would demand the enforcement of the point in the OAU Charter which said that "any question that might arise with regard to the interpretation of the charter

should be decided by a two-thirds majority in the assembly." Morocco was supported by delegations from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Egypt, Somalia, Tunisia, Sudan and several other states, which quite unequivocally announced that they would withdraw from the assembly, and possibly even from the OAU, if the SDAR's membership should be approved by a simple majority vote.

During the 18th Session of the OAU Assembly in Nairobi (June 1981), several African countries continued to promote the SDAR for OAU membership. Under these conditions, Hassan II gave his consent to a referendum in Western Sahara. He stressed, however, that the conditions of the referendum should correspond to the recommendations of the OAU special committee and to the "legitimate rights" of Morocco. The OAU Assembly commended Morocco's decision and formed a committee (the "committee of seven") to organize and hold a referendum in Western Sahara, made up of representatives of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Sudan, requesting it to work out the terms of a cease-fire "in conjunction with the conflicting parties" and to take the necessary measures for a "general referendum, conforming to general rules, on the self-determination of the Western Saharan people."<sup>24</sup> The assembly asked the United Nations to deploy a peace-keeping force in Western Sahara before and during the referendum and the subsequent elections. In spite of the demands of several countries, the assembly made a concession to Morocco by not mentioning POLISARIO in its resolution and not demanding the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Western Sahara. Morocco's consent to the referendum temporarily removed the question of the SDAR's membership in the OAU from the agenda. In this way, favorable conditions were established for a peaceful settlement. In August 1981 the "committee of seven" arrived at compromises with consideration for the opinions of various sides: A general and free referendum would be held in Western Sahara in cooperation with the United Nations; a cease-fire would be announced; a provisional neutral administration would be created; the troops of the conflicting sides would be recalled to their bases; UN or OAU peace-keeping forces would be deployed in Western Sahara, etc. Morocco and POLISARIO were called the conflicting parties, while Algeria and Mauritania were called parties with a direct interest in the settlement of the conflict. During the referendum the Western Saharan people were supposed to choose independence or annexation by Morocco.<sup>25</sup> No exact dates were set for the referendum. The committee did not insist on the withdrawal of the Moroccan troops and administration from Western Sahara. Therefore, the committee decision did not completely clarify the settlement issue.

The Moroccan side believed that the referendum should be of a "confirming nature"--that is, it should confirm the annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco.<sup>26</sup> Algeria called Hassan II's consent to the referendum "a step toward peace in the region" but was disturbed by Morocco's simultaneous reaffirmation of its rights to Western Sahara and refusal to have any contact with POLISARIO. The tension in the region continued. In spite of the insistent OAU appeals for a cease-fire, armed confrontations continued in Western Sahara.

Besides this, the United States began to display much more interest in this region, particularly Morocco, especially after the start of the Reagan Administration. High-placed American officials and representatives of the business community made more frequent visits to this country. According to reports in the foreign press, an agreement was concluded on increased U.S.

military aid to Morocco,<sup>27</sup> and on the establishment of a joint commission to coordinate military cooperation between the countries. Morocco expressed its willingness to let the United States use its territory as a transit base for the rapid deployment force in the event of an emergency situation in Africa or the Middle East. In exchange for this, the United States agreed to supply Morocco with some modern weapons.<sup>28</sup> The U.S. actions seriously worried Algeria and the POLISARIO front, in whose opinion American intervention in the Western Saharan conflict could lead to the even more serious escalation of tension in the region. France also disapproved of the expansion of American presence in Morocco, regarding this essentially as an attempt to crowd the former mother country out of its traditional sphere of influence.

The conflict was also exacerbated by a serious crisis in the OAU in connection with the question of the SDAR's membership in the organization.<sup>29</sup> In February 1982, at the 38th Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, OAU Secretary-General A. Kodjovi (Togo) took the initiative in inviting an SDAR delegation to attend the session and announcing the official acceptance of the SDAR as the 51st full member of the OAU, citing Article 28 of the OAU Charter, envisaging the acceptance of new members by a simple majority vote of the existing membership. Morocco resolutely protested the OAU secretary-general's actions, calling his decision "incompetent and illegal," and refused to continue participating in the work of the session. It was supported by 18 other African countries. The SDAR, Algeria and their supporters viewed the SDAR's membership as a great victory for progressive forces in the OAU.

To prevent a split in the organization, the OAU Buro and representatives of Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan--the members of the OAU special committee on Western Sahara--proposed that the question of the SDAR's membership in the OAU be discussed at the 19th session of the assembly in Tripoli in August 1982. The session was not held in Tripoli in August, however, because around half of the OAU members protested the presence of an SDAR delegation by refusing to attend. Even the SDAR delegation's consent to "voluntarily and temporarily" refrain from participating in the work of the session did not help.

The heads of state and government from 30 African countries who arrived in Tripoli to attend the session held an unofficial informational conference; they adopted the "Tripoli Declaration," in which they specifically reaffirmed their solidarity with the SDAR and the Saharan people in their struggle to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country.<sup>30</sup> They asked Morocco and the SDAR to consider possible solutions to the conflict and established a so-called "contact group" made up of representatives of Libya, Tanzania, Zambia, Congo and Mali. As a result of the efforts of the "contact group," a new date was set for the 39th Session of the OAU Council of Ministers and the 19th Session of the OAU Assembly in Tripoli on 15-26 November 1982. The SDAR Government announced that it would refrain from participating in the work of the session in the interest of overcoming differences of opinion and preserving OAU unity. This session was not convened either, however, due to the obstructionist position of several African countries. Therefore, all attempts to solve the Western Saharan problem again reached a standstill.

On 26 February 1983 Hassan II met with Algerian President C. Bendjedid on the Algerian-Moroccan border. They discussed the normalization of relations between the two countries and the possibility of solving the Western Saharan problem by creating a "Great Arab Maghreb." Favorable conditions were established for the 19th OAU Assembly Session in Addis Ababa in June 1983. The session asked Morocco and the POLISARIO front to begin direct talks on a cease-fire and on the guarantee of the necessary conditions for an OAU- and UN-sponsored fair referendum in Western Sahara. The referendum was even scheduled for the end of 1983. On 7 December 1983 the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution approving the decision of the 19th OAU Assembly Session on Western Sahara. But there were delays in its implementation. To put an end to the deadlock, the Mauritanian leadership decided on 26 February 1984 to officially recognize the SDAR and maintain trustworthy and friendly relations with it, based on the principles of mutual respect for national sovereignty, non-intervention in one another's internal affairs and the behavior of good neighbors. Nouakchott simultaneously announced that the recognition of the SDAR would not change the position of strict neutrality Mauritania had taken in relation to the Western Saharan conflict. Stressing that the Western Saharan problem could be solved only by political means, the Nouakchott government announced its intention to continue the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement.<sup>31</sup>

The facts show that the Western Saharan problem--a source of tension in Northwest Africa--is a situation of conflict; this conflict is sometimes more severe than others, but it is always explosive. Furthermore, it is keeping the African countries from solving the continent's urgent problems and is creating a favorable atmosphere for subversive activity by imperialist and reactionary forces wishing to destabilize the situation on the continent and split the OAU. The instability in Northwest Africa has given the United States a chance to interfere in the affairs of this region and reinforce its own military and political positions here. Under these conditions, the quickest possible resolution of the Western Saharan problem is quite important. Progressive forces and sensible politicians in Africa are seeking solutions to the problem not by means of military confrontation, but by peaceful political means with consideration for the interests of all parties directly involved in the conflict and with a view to the need to guarantee lasting peace and security in the region. The Soviet Union has invariably taken a principled position on the Western Saharan problem and advocated "the settlement of the Western Saharan problem in accordance with UN and OAU decisions and the recommendations of the nonaligned movement by allowing the Western Saharan people to exercise their right to self-determination."<sup>32</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The phosphorite deposits are estimated at 10 billion tons, including around 1.7 billion tons in known deposits. Western Sahara also has deposits of iron ore, copper, zinc, manganese, uranium, titanium and vanadium.
2. A. A. Shvedov, "Nezavisimaya Afrika: vneshnepoliticheskiye problemy, diplomaticeskaya bor'ba" [Independent Africa: Foreign Policy Issues and the Diplomatic Struggle], Moscow, 1983, p 104.

3. UN General Assembly Resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965.
4. UN General Assembly Resolution 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 (the reference is to Algeria, which first announced its interest in Western Sahara's future at this session).
5. UN General Assembly resolutions 2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2711 (XXV) of 14 December 1970, 2983 (XXVI) of 14 December 1972 and 3162 (XXVII) of 14 December 1973.
6. "L'Annee politique africaine 1975," Dakar, 1976, pp II-5.
7. "Istoriya diplomatii" [Diplomatic History], vol V, bk 2, Moscow, 1979, p 293.
8. UN General Assembly Resolution 3292 (XXIV) of 13 December 1974.
9. "Cours Internationale de Justice. Recueil des arrets, avis consultatifs et ordonnances. Sahara Occidental. Avis consultatif du 16 Octobre 1975. Role general No 61," The Hague, 1975, pp 68-69.
10. LE MONDE, 25 October 1975.
11. Security Council resolutions 377 (1975) of 22 October 1975, 379 (1975) of 2 November 1975 and 380 (1975) of 6 November 1975.
12. Resolution 3458 "A" (XXX) of 10 December 1975 was adopted with 88 votes of approval (including the USSR and other socialist countries) and 41 abstentions; Resolution 3458 "B" (XXX) of 10 December 1975 was adopted with 56 votes of approval (including the United States, France and Spain), 42 dissenting votes (including the USSR) and 34 abstentions.
13. UN Doc A/31/56-S/11997 of 26 February 1976.
14. CHaab (Nouakchott), 28-29 February 1976.
15. EL-MOUDJAHID (Algiers), 7-8 December 1975.
16. LE MATIN DU SAHARA (Casablanca), 16 April 1976.
17. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 August 1978.
18. THE GUARDIAN, 29 April 1977; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1977, No 836, p 44.
19. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, 1980, No 25, p 41; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1981, No 1044, p 17.
20. EL-MOUDJAHID, 6 August 1979.
21. UN Doc A/Res. 34/37 of 4 December 1979.

22. Three committees on Western Sahara were created between 1978 and 1983. Their composition essentially remained the same, and for this reason they continued to be called "committees of sages," just as they had been at the very beginning. Each committee was headed by the chairman of the OAU at that time.
23. EL-MOUDJAHID, 6 December 1979.
24. REVOLUTION AFRICAINE (Algiers), 1981, No 906, p 34.
25. A. A. Shvedov, Op. cit., p 110.
26. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1981, No 1071, p 22.
27. Assistance in 1983 was more than triple the 1982 figure (LE MONDE, 15 May 1982).
28. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 May 1982.
29. Also see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 6, pp 17-18.
30. PRAVDA, 11 August 1982.
31. LE SOLEIL (Dakar), 29 February 1984.
32. PRAVDA, 8 October 1983.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588

CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### IRANIAN REJECTION OF WESTERN BOURGEOIS CULTURE ANALYZED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 104-111

[Article by A. M. Grebnev: "Iran in the 1960's and 1970's: Perceptions of the Western Bourgeois Culture"]

[Text] The recent events in Iran and, in particular, their effect on the culture of this country call for serious analysis and conclusions. An extremely negative attitude toward all Western culture is a distinctive feature of Iran today. A detailed discussion of the attitude of anti-shah circles toward the Western culture during the period preceding the overthrow of the monarchy and the declaration of the Islamic republic should be useful in this connection.

When the so-called "white revolution" began in Iran, the development of capitalist relations in the country was stepped up dramatically. The resulting conflicts were simultaneously intensified. The immature political consciousness of the majority opposing the regime during the "white revolution," however, led to the identification of all problems with everything new in general, and of everything new with "everything Western." The widespread criticism of "everything Western" combined false interpretations of the West's cultural role, the denial of the real achievements of Western culture and pointed criticism of bourgeois ideology, morality and "cultural neocolonialism." Antimonarchic forces had more than sufficient grounds for their criticism of the latter.

In the shah's Iran it was not the progressive culture of Western Europe and the United States, which created world renowned values and was the birthplace of democratic and revolutionary-socialist directions in cultural and social development, that was being cultivated so intensively. On the contrary, the instigators of the "white revolution" gave the Western reactionary culture, its petty bourgeois and consumer models and standards and its amorality free access to Iran. The most deformed models of this "anticulture" became commonplace in Iran and were encountered by each Iranian literally everywhere. From the television and movie screens and from theater stages he was bombarded by base, inhumane and immoral sights, sounds and words profoundly contrary to the national cultural traditions, ethical standards and spiritual models that took thousands of years to develop.

The majority of people in Iran, most of whom were illiterate and were unable to properly assess Western culture as a whole, had a particularly strong negative reaction to everything Western, and especially everything American. The masses rejected the Western culture only because it was not Iranian, and the Islamic anti-shah opposition made extensive use of these feelings in its struggle for power. Of course, the Iranian intelligentsia, particularly its progressive and democratic segments, took a discerning approach to Western culture, separating things of real value--artistic, ideological and technological--from the deformed offspring of the capitalist "mass" and "consumer" culture.

This is why movie theaters, restaurants, bars and other places of entertainment were attacked in the first days of the anti-shah revolution of 1979 along with the foreign banks symbolizing Western economic domination.

Although ruling circles in the shah's Iran constantly underscored the antiquity of the Iranian--primarily pre-Islamic--civilization, its uniqueness and its superiority, they actively disseminated the reactionary Western culture the people despised so much. Verbally opposing any "imported ideology," the shah's regime actually opened the doors of Iranian culture to the ideology of Western imperialist circles and simultaneously persecuted the promoters of progressive, revolutionary-democratic ideas, which were also rooted in the spiritual life of the Western countries. The shah's adviser on culture was Shojaeddin Shafah, a zealous supporter of the American bourgeois, Western reactionary "way of life." R. N. Frye, the director of the American Institute in Isfahan, was one of the most energetic publicists of this way of life. A large group of institute "researchers" gave the shah's regime recommendations on "cultural policy." The shah's proposed "synthesis" of the Eastern and Western cultures, which actually meant that some elements of the Iranian spiritual culture would be merged with the standards of the Western bourgeois culture, was largely a result of the "theories" of this group. Within the framework of this "synthesis," the Iranian element was mainly of an external, decorative-ethnographic nature.

The penetration of the shah's Iran by bourgeois Western culture was conducted along a broad front and in many directions. People in the country then spoke of a boom of "renewal" and "innovation," on the wave of which hundreds of export-import companies and firms trading with the West made their appearance. This engendered an entire social substratum, which grew richer not by the day but by the hour and which was engaged in imports, middleman operations and speculation in foreign goods. The children of these "nouveaux riches" were sent abroad to study and, after receiving an education there, they returned to Iran to occupy key positions in government and private establishments. This was completely consistent with the neocolonial aims of the United States, which was striving to create a separate stratum of people in Iran for the dissemination of Western bourgeois cultural values. This is how CIA analysts described this social stratum: "A new class which could give traditional social strata serious competition is in the formative stage. It is professionally educated and represents an administrative middle class. Its members reject traditional relations and rely on a modern education. They have extensive non-traditional experience, and the majority do not accept

Islam as a guide for living."<sup>1</sup> The anti-shah opposition pointedly criticized this social stratum. An example of this criticism can be seen in a statement by SORUSH magazine (in republican Iran), which described the stratum of "pro-Western administrators" and singled out certain of their features, such as "hostility toward everything national, the worship of Western authorities, a thirst for luxury, bureaucratism, blind faith in the power of official documents, mutual guarantees, narrowmindedness, an indifferent attitude toward professional duties, an inability to make sacrifices, a fear of leaving the office desk, nepotism instead of observance of the laws, a thirst for expensive things, admiration for strength and the use of strength in dealings with weaker individuals, a life of illusion and a desire to defraud."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, it was precisely this segment of the Iranian elite that became the object of fierce hatred on the part of anti-shah circles and was regarded by them as the center of all possible evil.

After the oil boom began in 1974, the ruling class in the country entered a real race for villas, ultramodern homes and luxury items. Iran turned into an international marketplace of foreign goods, where a small substratum grew rich and the media under its control portrayed this as a "triumph of Western culture" and extolled the successes of "civilization" and the "new life" of the people. The press portrayed these mercenary excesses as an integral part of "progress." The nouveaux riches did everything possible to emulate the Western bourgeois lifestyle. Luxuries were displayed ostentatiously, and this was inconsistent with the moral outlook of the masses and with their centuries-old beliefs about the standards of everyday life, morality and behavior.

Here is another example of the criticism of this "way of life"--a satirical article entitled "The Parasites Are Still Sighing About the 'Great Civilization,'" published in ETTELA'AT after the coup: "Abundant supplies of rice, wheat, butter and eggs came from America. Meat, canned vegetables, an assortment of jams and honey came from Ceylon year-round. Each morning veal from Paris arrived on an Air France plane. Part of this was sent to the palace, part was delivered to first-class restaurants and cabarets and part was set aside for phone orders by 'the people.' Airplanes regularly delivered products other than meat: German sausages, Italian macaroni, Dutch cheese, French canned frog legs and Spanish crab. The government was so concerned about 'the people' that tulips were shipped in from Holland, whiskey from the United States and Scotland and video tapes from Japan. The higher-ups could pick up the phone and order clothes from a tailor in Hong Kong."<sup>3</sup>

This is how the people saw "Western life." And the simple people realized that this was a paradise only for the rich. All types of casinos, nightclubs, bowling alleys, dance halls, bars and pornographic movies and publications entered Iranian daily life during those years. The traditional mentality took a particularly dim view of the fact that the "women of the rich circles" copied the lives of Hollywood "stars," went to nightclubs, played cards and wore Western-style low-cut dresses, which was contrary to traditional Iranian ideas about decency. Prostitution in its Western forms (and not the traditional Eastern ones) flourished. In addition to the semilegal public houses, there were entire streets and neighborhoods where these women openly plied their trade.

This posed a threat to the family traditions and standards of Iranian society. In the eyes of the average Iranian, the progressive "Western" idea of equality for women, which was so essential to the progress of a feudal monarchic society like the Iranian one, was discredited for a long time. After the overthrow of the monarchy, this led to the development of aggressive tendencies in the sphere of family relations.

The attachment of the shah's Iran to the Western imperialist powers was so extreme that in the years preceding the revolution there was a paradoxical situation in which an Iranian could get to England or the FRG more quickly and easily than to some Iranian cities. Western tourist agencies organized "tours" for Iranians on preferential terms to show them the superiority of the "Western" way of life. The itinerary always included visits to entertainment spots of the lowest caliber.<sup>4</sup>

The cultivation of philistine Western standards, primarily American ones, had a devastating effect on the Iranian way of life and on culture in general. It would be wrong, however, to view the Iranian traditional society as some kind of progressive and highly moral standard. This society was also distinguished by cultural backwardness, religious fanaticism, extreme xenophobia and hypocrisy and all types of regression--the remaining traces of Iran's "own" national forms of social parasitism and centuries-old feudal-landowner, autocratic-monarchic and bourgeois-mercantile domination. The most striking and extremely unacceptable forms of spiritual oppression, however, appeared before the masses in "Western," primarily American, trappings.

School textbooks, which were copies of European textbooks of half a century before, were filled with the worst models of bourgeois Western pseudo-culture. The 7 or 8 years Iranian students spent in Western universities and institutes (and this was the main method used in the shah's Iran to solve the problem of training highly skilled personnel) obviously also "Westernized" Iranian cultural life. The culture was also injured by the emigration of local specialists to the West (a "brain drain").

The mass media were used quite actively for the ideological expansion of imperialism. The book market was inundated with cheap novels preaching a primitive level of consciousness and an obsession with wealth, sex and violence. The television program and movie market was effectively monopolized by foreign film companies. American army radio and television centers in Tehran publicized the Western way of life almost around the clock. The Western influence was quite pervasive. The external appearance of Iranian cities changed, even the storefronts. The following stores were located on just one part of Vali Asr Street in Tehran: "Palermo," "Barbico," "Chattanooga," "Diamond," "Riviera," "Alfredo," "La Cucaracha" and "Pledge Gate."

As the urban population grew, the architectural and aesthetic appearance of Iranian cities began to change. Obviously, progress in the construction industry and the introduction of industrial construction methods from the West could not fail to revitalize the Iranian city and stimulate its development. In general, the influence of European and American builders and designers was productive. Anything that led to a break with the reactionary

feudal architectural rules connected with a medieval way of life and thinking was also quite positive. The problem was, however, that the positive advances in architecture were accompanied by the boom in mercenary excesses and led to the mechanical addition of new forms to medieval urban structures without any attempt at the organic combination of the achievements of the old Iranian architecture with the new and efficient features of Western architecture. A building was erected in accordance with the mercenary slogan "Build it and sell it." Under these conditions, the break with architectural tradition began to be regarded as a direct attack on national culture in general and was seen as an attempt to supplant it with forms alien to the Iranian national spirit. The average Iranian was particularly affected by the break with tradition in residential designs. All of the intelligent aspects of the old architecture, connected with consideration for natural conditions, were forgotten.

In the second half of the 1970's, when the negative influence of the bourgeois Western culture in Iran assumed particularly large dimensions and the masses began to express their dissatisfaction more and more actively, the shah took a number of propaganda actions to create the impression that the elite was disturbed by the pervasive influence of the Western way of life and culture. A propaganda campaign was launched to restore the "true spiritual values" of Iranians. The ideas of "shahinshah" and "love for the shah" were prominent among these values. These ideas were widely publicized in the shah's book "Toward the Great Civilization." "We are trying," it said, "to create a culture of the future, and we must see to it that the spiritual authority of the Iranian people, the eternal national cultural values, the exceptional spiritual refinement and elegance which retained their healthy principles in the battles of the past, will withstand the trials of our era and retain their influence and even expand the sphere of their influence."<sup>5</sup> After many years of prohibitions, newspapers began to publish accounts of culturological disputes regarding various spheres of Iranian spiritual life. But it was during the course of these disputes that the anti-shah opposition began to acquire increasing authority in the public mind. The corrupting influence of the Western bourgeois culture in all areas of the traditional Iranian way of life was harshly criticized and the broad-scale revival of national traditions was advocated.

It should be borne in mind that the criticism of Western culture and the defense of Iranian national traditions were primarily an inappropriate reaction to the contradictions of the internal development of Iranian society and Iranian culture. Dissatisfaction with the shah's policies in general, including the cultivation of Western bourgeois standards and morals, caused the overwhelming majority of Iranians, including the intelligentsia, to view everything reactionary and hostile to their needs as "Western." Obviously, this was the result of a nationalist shift in their thinking and the growth of religious fanaticism and utopian illusions. Under the specific conditions of the shah's dictatorship and the cultural policy the shah was pursuing, however, these feelings had the earmarks of opposition views and contained some features of democratic, anti-imperialist and antidespotic protest. Culture--or, more precisely, public opinion on the cultural situation--became an important sphere for the expression of opposition feelings.

The debates on the past and present state of Iranian music were a characteristic example of the use of cultural subject matter for the broader purposes of

ideological struggle. Many articles in specialized and sociopolitical publications spoke of the pitiful state of national music. This was blamed on the "dominance" of Western music in Iran. The author of one of these articles in RASTAHIZ wrote that the Iranian students who had been sent to Europe to study the art of other countries and enrich their own culture had begun to criticize Iranian music and attack musicians when they returned to their homeland and to ignore national musical traditions when they formed orchestras and wrote operas. The article said that such outstanding Iranian musicians as Hasan Kesan, Ebadi and Jalil Shahnaz Bohari were not even considered to be musicians by the "innovators" because they could not read music.<sup>6</sup>

Abstract comparisons and contrasts of Iran's "own" culture and the "alien" Western culture were prominent in these articles. The Iranian author did not realize the limitations of this kind of comparison. He did not realize that he could defend his "own" only by praising progressive tendencies in Iranian music, and not every aspect of it. The progressive, democratic tendencies and achievements of music in the Western countries were completely ignored. It is easy to see, however, that this essentially nationalist form of cultural protest was a reaction to the cultivation of the Western musical pseudo-culture in Iran, the cultivation of its dissonant and stupefying forms, its synthesized quasi-music. This was the reaction of patriotic groups to the nouveau riche contempt for Iranian musical traditions and the treatment of the latter as an allegedly obsolete and unproductive form of culture. Some supporters of Western music in Iran believed, and not without good reason, that the music of Iran, India, Vietnam, Japan and other Eastern countries could be combined harmoniously with Western music. Traditionalists, however, had a negative reaction even to this prospect and were afraid that traditional Eastern music would "lose its purity" and be "defiled" by the West. The supporters of traditional music believed that this kind of combination would result in unnatural hybrids not conforming to the musical tastes of the people of the East or the people of the West, hybrids alien to both groups. This would seem to testify to the limited views of traditionalists, as everyone knows how productive the reciprocal influence in art and creative endeavors combining features of different cultures have been in the last millennium of cultural history.

The debates on music were not confined to purely artistic subjects. They had extensive social overtones and contained opposition-minded and essentially democratic remarks. For example, an analytical survey of the country's music under the shah's regime said: "The wealth of national culture cannot be replaced by the characteristic indifference of the generation of long-haired cafeteria habitues and admirers of fashionable 'isms.' The reason for the errors of the artists who give their talent to 'cross-bred' music indisputably consists in their lack of understanding or even their lack of knowledge of the interaction of artistic and social factors. This eventually leads to a loss of contact with people and society. And this does not mean that they should blindly cater to the tastes of the masses, satisfy underdeveloped tastes and blindly obey the wishes of the masses. The people must be educated, their level of thinking must be raised and their artistic sense must be developed."<sup>7</sup>

These views were also characteristic of processes in the country's art in general. This is attested to by the heated debates on the state of the

Iranian theater. Theater critic Sadegh Bahrami wrote of the "chaos in the theater" and said that "we do not have anything that can be called real theater"; Arham Sadr said that "the theater, like a seriously ill person, is being sustained by health tonics, pills and capsules"; Peri Saberi wrote of "the stagnant and sluggish theater, full of bureaucratism and mechanical administration." There were only 9 dramatic companies, consisting of only 200 actors and technical personnel, in a country with a population of 35 million. The companies changed their repertoire every 2 or 3 years. Total confusion reigned in the administration of the theater business. Renowned Iranian actor Ali Nasirian, who was appointed chief of the theater administration in 1976, said in an interview: "The theater administration is not satisfying our artistic needs; it requires radical and fundamental changes."<sup>8</sup> Assessing the atmosphere of theatrical life in Iran, the illegal communist press noted that supporters of the regime felt that it was their duty to cultivate conciliation, a lack of principle and vulgarity instead of artistic creativity and to smother genuine creativity and folk art; they did everything within their power to discourage popular and progressive drama and any form of moral purity, art and genuine innovation.<sup>9</sup>

In this way, the pernicious influence of the shah's regime reached every sphere of art. On the one hand, the dissatisfied were suppressed and, on the other, the hesitant were bribed and artists were turned into bureaucrats and day-laborers. The regime tried to direct art into the channels of the mercantile race for success with the most undiscerning public, to turn performers, musicians and artists into clowns and jesters grimacing for the amusement of the nouveaux riches and to foster the most ultra-fashionable schools and currents of avant-garde art. This is how the progressive public viewed the monarchic regime's performance in the sphere of art. The prevailing atmosphere of that time was aptly described by a derisive phrase used by the artistic intelligentsia: "Become a eunuch and enter the harem through the front door!"

Art festivals and holidays were organized with government funds in various cities from 1967 on. They included the "Shiraz Art Holiday," "Festival in Tusa," "Folk Culture Holiday," "Tehran International Film Festival," "Children's Film Festival," "Asian Film Festival" and other similar undertakings. Each festival represented a group of political actions in the sphere of culture which helped to entrench the Western bourgeois culture in the country and to weaken and suppress specifically national traditions. Progressive Iranian artists pointed out the pro-Western nature of these events and the extensive advertising of Western bourgeois art at the festivals. They stressed that only entrants who "looked mainly to the West for inspiration" were successful in these events.<sup>10</sup> In connection with this, the organizers of festivals were directly accused of alienating the public and ignoring its cultural interests. "There was so little contact with the people," ETTELA'AT noted, "that, whether consciously or unconsciously, only a negligible number of artists satisfied their needs and wishes."<sup>11</sup>

It must be said that in the heat of these arguments attempts were made to denigrate certain outstanding masters of Western culture. For example, the same ETTELA'AT attacked world-renowned English theater director Peter Brook, the man responsible for celebrated productions of Shakespearean tragedies. The newspaper took the same kind of nihilistic position on the works of

contemporary West German composer K. Stockhausen. ETTELA'AT questioned the right of these great artists to participate in the festivals.

The Shiraz art festival was the most indicative sign of official policy on art. It was held annually for 11 years from 1967 on. Officials stated several times that the purpose of this festival was "the establishment of close ties between Eastern and Western art, a knowledge of the art of regions unfamiliar to Iranians and the construction of a bridge between Eastern art and Western art." Opposition critics noted that although Iranian folk and classical art was represented at the festival, it occupied an extremely insignificant place, the attitude of festival organizers toward it was just short of contemptuous, and the festival image was not colored in the slightest by this art. At first the festival aroused the interest of artists and the general public. Soon, however, there was increasing anger at its openly pro-Western bias. Even the official press commented that the majority of programs, both Iranian and foreign, "were so alien to our spiritual and cultural atmosphere that it sometimes appeared as though a few of the organizers of the so-called art festival in Shiraz brought the programs into the country exclusively for their own pleasure."<sup>12</sup>

The criticism in the press grew more severe with time. There were comments about the alien sound of the "ear-splitting" Western music and of the unacceptability of modern Western productions to Iranians. This is why opposition newspapers remarked that the festival served no purpose and could not make contact with the people, as a result of which the cancellation of the 12th festival bothered only those who had come from abroad for a huge slice of the rich pie or who wanted to win dubious fame and command more money in Iran itself.

There was an indignant reaction to Portuguese director V. Garcia's plan to stage a production of "Sacred Rites," a play in which young men and women were supposed to perform in the nude, at one festival. The production of a play called "The Pig, the Fire and the Child" at the last festival, the 11th, evoked vehement protests from the public and the press. According to the director's plan, it was supposed to be performed in a store in Shiraz and include overtly pornographic scenes. KEYHAN reported that "dramatic productions or programs which were obviously amoral could not appeal to the people."<sup>13</sup>

The Shiraz art festival was distinguished by colossal splendor, and this cost a great deal. The elite was indifferent, however, to the material needs connected with the development and dissemination of Iranian folklore and classical culture. With its extreme admiration for Western culture and its contemptuous approach to Iranian folklore and classical art, the festival in Shiraz evoked a lack of public enthusiasm in its last years and gradually lost its audience. After the fall of the shah, it ceased to be held, just as, incidentally, all other cultural events. But the development of culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a different subject and does not belong in this article.

The developmental trends of Iranian art during the period of the shah's dictatorship were indicative in several respects. In the first place, they were an example of the oppressive and stifling effect of the unimpeded infiltration of the culture and art of today's Asian states by the bourgeois

culture serving neocolonial ideological aims. The United States has been particularly active in this sphere. In recent years U.S. ideological services have intensified their "cultural" expansion in the East. This expansion in the developing countries is supposed to publicize the Western way of life and implant the bourgeois culture and then the capitalist model of social development in these countries. This policy is designed to undermine the national cultures of developing countries and to destroy them "from within" by influencing the minds, habits and traditions of their people. Iran is an extremely indicative example of this practice.

In the second place, developmental trends in Iranian art also attest to the failure of one of neocolonialism's attempts to instill bourgeois cultural stereotypes in the spiritual life of the newly liberated states, as well as to the failure of the cultural policy of reactionary regimes with contempt for the culture of their own country and its people. This cultural policy produced completely different results: an unforeseen and severe mass reaction and the birth of new socioideological points of reference.

In the third place, tendencies in the development of Iranian art proved that the forcible propagation of the Western bourgeois culture in an Eastern country leads to an outburst of social, political and cultural protest. Despite all the complexity and heterogeneity of this protest in Iran, certain forms of "anti-Westernism" reflected the displeasure of broad segments of the democratic public with the pro-imperialist policy of ruling circles and with the neocolonial policy of the bourgeois West in Iran. On the whole, the nationalist nature of this wave of cultural protest cannot obscure the anti-imperialist and anticolonial tendencies the protest signaled. The cultural movement in pre-revolutionary Iran was an important factor in the preparations for the anti-shah revolution of 1979.

The popular masses had an extremely negative reaction to the foreign cultural influence in Iran in the 1960's and particularly in the 1970's, and an overt struggle was launched against Western culture as a whole. There is no question that this had a negative effect on the development of the present-day Iranian culture and its interaction with world culture. As recent events in Iran have proved, the symbiosis of "cultural neocolonialism" and the reactionary bourgeois modernization of culture inflicted colossal injuries on the progressive process of the interaction of Eastern and Western cultures and set up new obstacles to impede the development of the progressive, democratic aspects and features of the present-day culture and social life of the Iranian people.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Documents of the Spy's Nest. The Shah's Relations with America," No 7, Tehran, 1983, p 162.
2. SORUSH, 1981, No 122, p 24.
3. ETTELA'AT, 14 December 1981.

4. Ibid.
5. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, "Toward the Great Civilization," Tehran, 1977, p 336.
6. RASTAHIZ, 26 November 1977.
7. Ibid.
8. KEYHAN, 14 August 1976.
9. DON'YA, October 1977, pp 34-41.
10. ETTELA'AT, 2 October 1978.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 18 August 1978.
13. KEYHAN, 30 September 1978.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN ASIAN DEVELOPING STATES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 118-122

[Report by V. A. Fedorov on international science symposium organized by Oriental Studies Institute in November 1983: "The Evolution of Political Structures in the Developing Asian Countries"]

[Text] The formation and transformation of political structures in the Asian states were the topic of discussion at an international science symposium held in the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1983. The symposium was organized by a working group studying socio-political and ideological processes in the Eastern countries in conjunction with a working group on current events in South Asia as part of the problem commission on multilateral cooperation by the science academies of socialist countries.

After he welcomed representatives from the GDR, Bulgaria, USSR and CSSR, Deputy Director G. K. Shirokov of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, noted that these structures combine elements of the traditional society with the society developing along capitalist lines. The combination of these elements varies in different countries depending on their specific historical conditions. The attempts of many Asian states to copy the political order of the Western countries have been unsuccessful because the borrowed political institutions of developed capitalist states have been unsuitable for the transitional Eastern societies.

The relationship between traditional and modern elements in Asian countries was the subject of a report by N. A. Simoniya (USSR). The Eastern countries, in his opinion, conform to the tertiary model of capitalism, which differs considerably from the preceding ones in terms of its genesis (the compulsory colonial variety) and in terms of the historical era. The socioeconomic structure of these countries simultaneously contains three diverse components (the traditionalist sector, the national-capitalist sector and the neocolonial synthesis), which interact and engender various models of synthesis and, consequently, various sociopolitical structures.

In a report on the class characteristics of political party systems in the developing countries, V. I. Maksimenko (USSR) paid special attention to the functions of the national state and the class nature of the forces in power.

The state in the newly liberated countries is, firstly, a collective entrepreneur and consequently the basis of class formation and, secondly, a national integrative force counteracting many communal clan tendencies. In contrast to the bourgeois state in the Western countries, which took shape as a superstructure above the civil society, the national state in the Asian and African countries preceded the civil society, absorbing the organizational experience of traditional structures and establishing authoritarian control, within the bounds of "national" unity, over a struggle involving not so much classes as various groups, clans, ethnic and religious communities, etc. On the basis of this hypothesis, V. I. Maksimenko concluded that a single class cannot have absolute power under the conditions of post-colonial social development; political power in the developing countries is always in the nature of a bloc or a compromise. The structure of the ruling bloc in any specific country is subject to reorganization "from above" but it also reflects the growth of social differentiation and class struggle.

Examining the specific features of the political struggle in the East with a view to the traditional factor, A. I. Ionova (USSR) noted some of the peculiarities of the present evolution of religious-political associations. The main reasons for the increased activity of religious-political associations in the Afro-Asian countries, in her opinion, are the aroused political awareness of the popular masses still living in a world of traditional religious beliefs and the discrediting of "pro-Western" methods of mass mobilization and organization due to their pro-capitalist and often pro-imperialist essence. This is why the present intensification of traditional principles in the activities of the majority of religious parties in the Eastern countries has been seen in mass propaganda and agitation as well as in the sphere of ideology and has taken organizational forms. A characteristic feature of the religious-political associations is their frequent representation of population groups with conflicting class interests--from the exploitative substratum which uses the heritage of the past to secure its own interests to members of the laboring public with anticapitalist and anti-imperialist views. Tendencies in the current evolution of religious-political associations, however, indicate that this evolution is coinciding to some degree with the development of secular parties with a comparable social composition and mass base.

In his report, E. Georgiev (Bulgaria) paid special attention to the evolution of the ideology of pan-Arabism. He noted that the pan-Arabist ideas which became popular in the Middle East in the second half of the 1950's were based on a recognition of the need to combine the struggle for Arab unity with the struggle for liberation from colonial and semicolonial dependence. The ideologists of pan-Arabism believed that the assumption of power by nationalist forces would soon lead to the unification of Arab countries and the convergence of their political structures. These ideas, which are sometimes called "revolutionary pan-Arabism," gave rise to Ba'athism in Syria. E. Georgiev believes that Nasir was the first to take specific steps to implement the ideas of pan-Arabism, but he concluded after the disintegration of the UAR that Arab unity could not be achieved without the institution of social reforms in individual countries and without reliance on revolutionary democratic forces. After the war of June 1967, when it became imperative to create an anti-Israel coalition and to surmount the political and ideological differences of Arab

states, Nasirism completely dissociated itself from "revolutionary pan-Arabism," and this caused the further erosion of the latter.

The synthesis of traditional and modern factors in the political struggle in the rural community was the subject of a report by S. A. Panarin (USSR), who discussed the effect of the new rural social institutions (cooperatives, communal and integrative development organizations and agencies of self-government) on the political consciousness of the landless peasants who constitute the largest segment of the rural population. The new institutions, in spite of their great potential ability to modernize the political thinking and behavior of the underprivileged, can promote only partial advances in this area. An obvious departure from traditional standards of behavior is seen when parties fight openly for control over the new institutions as effective instruments for the political mobilization of mass support. The political awareness of the underprivileged is perceptibly heightened under the influence of leftist parties, when the new social institutions are used by the underprivileged as an organizational form for the protection of their interests by legal means.

J. Becka (CSSR) said that the experience of Burma testifies that many political events in the Eastern countries today are rooted in the liberation movements of World War II. After Burma won its independence, most of the people who were active in national politics were leaders of the liberation movement. Another important result of the war was the active involvement of soldiers in politics, as the national army was a part of the nationwide organization in the liberation struggle. The liberation movement of World War II also stimulated radical and leftist tendencies in social affairs. This is specifically reflected in the leftist position taken by the main antigovernmental movements.

The sociopolitical characteristics of employees, bureaucrats and intellectuals as the basis of political movements in the Eastern countries were examined in a report by L. A. Fridman (USSR). There are now around 40 million employees, bureaucrats, specialists and so forth in the newly liberated countries (their number is approximately equal to the number of industrial workers employed at relatively large enterprises). These social groups, which differ considerably from the bourgeoisie and from the working class, display relative independence in the sphere of sociopolitical relations. The intense social differentiation of these strata and their contradictory intermediate position, however, explain their support of different and even conflicting political movements. The prevailing tendency is still the convergence of the larger employee groups with the industrial proletariat, which establishes an objective basis for broad social-class coalitions fighting for radical reforms in the newly liberated countries.

Many speakers analyzed the evolution of political structures under the conditions of bourgeois-authoritarian rule. Special attention was given to authoritarian regimes supported by the army and police. V. A. Fedorov (USSR) stressed that the political activity of the army in many Eastern countries was directly connected with the efforts of ruling circles to accelerate capitalist modernization. The army was supposed to guarantee "stability and order" and create the necessary conditions for intensive capitalist development. During the performance of these functions by the army and police, a single diversified

military-police system took shape and performed coercive and administrative functions as well as purely political and ideological functions separately performed by political parties, social organizations or civilian government agencies. This heightened the ability of authoritarian regimes to accomplish the political mobilization of the masses, resort to political maneuvers and give the regimes a "democratic facade."

The development of capitalist relations and the changing balance of power among social classes in this group of countries lead to changes in these regimes in the direction of bourgeois representation. This process is strictly monitored by the military-police system, however, to prevent active involvement by the broad popular masses in politics. Within the general framework of the regime's transformation, there is also a tendency toward the evolution of the army's political role from the direct rule of military circles to an army functioning as a "political arbiter," objectively serving the interests of the grand bourgeoisie.

The contradictory nature of sociopolitical development under the conditions of accelerated capitalist modernization was pointed out by V. M. Mazurov (USSR), who used the functioning of the Taiwan and South Korean regimes as examples in his analysis. He noted that intensive industrialization had brought about serious changes in the social-class structure of society but had not changed the authoritarian police-administrative functions of the state. According to the speaker, the "disorder" in this model stems primarily from a lack of correspondence between economic growth and political development. This also makes the active demonstrations by various social strata (primarily urban middle strata) for a bourgeois-democratic system of government understandable.

The evolution of the state-political system of Pakistan was the subject of a report by V. N. Moskalenko (USSR). He noted the cyclical nature of this evolution, reflected in the alternation of the civilian constitutional-parliamentary form of government with an undisguised military dictatorship. The reasons for this can be found in the socioeconomic structure of Pakistani society, which has forced ruling classes to resort to openly coercive methods of government to secure their dominance and to use bourgeois-democratic methods whenever possible. The present military regime in Pakistan has been in power much longer than its predecessors. For this reason, influential segments of the dominant class are afraid that the widespread opposition movement against the military regime, developing under general democratic slogans, might acquire social-class features.

I. Wessel (GDR) discussed the role of political parties under the conditions of the authoritarian government in Indonesia, paying special attention to the evolution of Golkar in connection with the third congress (October 1983) of this government-sponsored political organization and the congress decision to turn Golkar into a cadre organization. Wessel believes that the government's efforts to strengthen Golkar are designed primarily to reduce the influence of other political organizations and to restrict the functioning of the party system as a whole. At the same time, the Indonesian authoritarian regime is taking steps to strengthen the army's influence in social affairs and strengthen its control over political processes in the country. Ruling circles intend

the controlled evolution of the regime in the direction of the kind of bourgeois-parliamentary system that would be most consistent with the current level of capitalist development and simultaneously guarantee the retention of important political functions by the armed forces.

The role of government-sponsored political organizations in the exercise of power by ruling groups was examined by Ye. V. Golubeva (USSR), who used Golkar in Indonesia and the New Society Movement in the Philippines as examples. These organizations, created "from above" by administrative means, on the initiative of centers of political and economic control and with the active participation of the army, are guided in their actions by government development programs and official government ideology and are consequently part of the government structure and perform the functions of an appendage of the executive authority. They function as political parties only during election campaigns, when they serve as the government's sounding-board. These government-sponsored political organizations are characteristic of the model of bureaucratic rule, which is distinguished by highly concentrated power, the domination of the executive link of government and the limitation of political participation by the masses.

The influence of tradition and religion on political processes in countries with authoritarian regimes was the subject of a report by I. Kobarj (CSSR), who examined the political aspects of the Islamization of Pakistani society. Until the second half of the 1970's the demand for Islamization was voiced primarily by the clerics, whereas the government had no objective interest in this process. After Zia-ul-Haq took power, Islamization became government policy, was conducted "from above" and was openly used to strengthen the dictatorship, arousing the discontent of broad segments of the population, including the supporters of the use of Islamic principles in politics. The military methods of conducting Islamization have also been condemned by much of the clergy.

Some aspects of the functioning of bourgeois-democratic political systems, with India as an example, were examined in a number of reports and speeches and during debates.

E. N. Komarov (USSR) proposed a new method of content analysis to trace the evolution of the positions of the main Indian political parties between 1962 and 1980. The method is based on an analysis of the campaign manifestos of national parties on economic, social and political problems.

V. V. Chernovskaya (USSR) discussed the degree and forms of the influence of leading capitalist associations on the activity of legislative and executive bodies in such countries as India and Nigeria. The increasing interaction of politics and economics in the developing countries helped to turn "extra-party capitalist associations" into centers of active sociopolitical influence. Close cooperation between business associations and the government on an informal basis compensated in India and Nigeria for the ineffectiveness of the system, characteristic of developed capitalist countries, of communication between the bourgeois elite and the government through the parliament and ruling parties. According to the speaker, the objective laws of economic

growth, particularly the centralization of production and capital, will increase the influence of business associations and heighten their involvement in government and public administration. In connection with this, the "extra-party capitalist centers" could seriously restrict the maneuvering of the political elite, which has retained a certain degree of autonomy thus far.

In a report entitled "Socialist Orientation and the Problem of Tradition," V. G. Khoros (Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) distinguished between two attitudes toward tradition and traditional structures in socialist-oriented countries: populist and revolutionary-democratic. For the former the central thesis is the idea that elements of traditional communal collectivism and solidarity can and must be transplanted into the process of the non-capitalist reorganization of society. The latter is more likely to criticize pre-capitalist institutions and patterns of thinking. Comparing the two, the speaker concluded that the underestimation of traditions and of the need to adapt to them and to use some of their progressive elements, which is characteristic of some national democrats, is just as wrong as their overestimation, which is sometimes done by revolutionary populists (in Mali, Tanzania and other countries).

W. Hundt (GDR) discussed the interaction of the political structures of Eastern states and their foreign policy. One of the distinctive features of these countries is that changes in their foreign policy aims are often evident much earlier than changes in their domestic political structure. For example, reactionary ruling circles in some countries have established close relations with imperialist states and have effectively promoted the policy of the latter in order to rely on outside assistance and support in their subsequent establishment and reinforcement of undemocratic repressive regimes in these countries. The experience of socialist-oriented states proves, on the other hand, that an active anti-imperialist policy and the establishment of close cooperation with socialist countries promotes progressive revolutionary reforms in the sociopolitical structure of these states. Hundt also said that the characteristic fluctuations in the foreign policy aims of a number of developing countries are directly related to the instability of their political structures and the spasmodic nature of their political processes.

Speakers noted the need to continue the study of the distinctive features of political structures and political processes in the developing world.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### NIGERIA SUBJECT OF SYMPOSIUM FOR SOVIET, BLOC SCHOLARS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 146-147

[Report on Fifth International Symposium of Socialist Researchers on the "Political, Economic and Cultural Development of Present-Day Nigeria" in Sofia in 1983]

[Text] The fifth international symposium of researchers from the socialist countries on "The Political, Economic and Cultural Development of Present-Day Nigeria" was held in Sofia (Bulgaria) in 1983 and was attended by researchers from Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR and also from Nigeria.

Participants were welcomed by Deputy Chairman G. Stoichkov of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, co-chairman of the intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation between Bulgaria and Nigeria. More than 30 reports and speeches were presented. "Economics and Oil" was the main topic of discussion. A number of reports on this subject stressed the dangers connected with the policy of relying exclusively on oil. According to P. Petkov (Bulgaria), for example, Nigeria's successful industrialization and its evolution from an agrarian country into an agrarian-industrial one will depend largely on the stepped-up development of all branches of the extractive industry--oil, gas, coal, iron ore and others--as well as branches of the processing industry, which will account for a larger share of the GDP.

It is probable, however, that the petroleum industry will remain the most important economic sector and the main source of foreign currency receipts in the state budget. It is probable not only because of Nigeria's large oil deposits (in 1982 these deposits were estimated at 2.3 billion tons, or 29 percent of all known oil deposits in Africa and 2.8 percent of the total in the non-socialist world), but also because of the possible rise in the demand for oil in the world within the near future, which could increase Nigerian oil production again.

Nigeria, according to M. Vasilev (Bulgaria), is more vulnerable (than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Libya and other countries) to oil prices and to cuts in oil production and exports. Its export income in 1982 was 49.2 percent below the 1980 figure. This was due exclusively to sharp cuts in oil exports because oil accounts for over 95 percent of Nigeria's export income.

The economic depression in Nigeria in the early 1980's was the result of the dependence of its economy on world capitalism, P. Jegzentis (GDR) said. This dependence turned Nigeria into a mono-export country. The situation is complicated by the fact that the sale of Nigerian oil in the world capitalist market is not under the control of the Nigerian state.

The oil boom of the early 1970's had a negative effect on agricultural development in Nigeria, P. I. Kupriyanov (USSR) said. The widely publicized campaign of the second half of the 1970's to "feed the country" was a failure. The program of the "green revolution," which the government of the second republic began to carry out in 1980, was also ineffective. All of this meant that huge sums had to be spent on imported food. The measures taken in 1982 to restrict imports led to an unprecedented rise in prices and the severe deterioration of economic conditions.

Several speakers analyzed various aspects of Bulgaria's cooperation with Nigeria. A report on trade relations between the two countries (M. Todorova, Bulgaria), for example, spoke of the real possibility of buying iron ore, steel, cotton and leather from Nigeria in the future and of considerably increasing imports of rubber, tropical wood and other commodities. S. Nikolov (Bulgaria) cited interesting statistics on Bulgarian aid to Nigeria in the training of highly skilled personnel. In the 1972/73 academic year, 3,331 foreigners studied in Bulgaria, and 81 were Nigerians (2.4 percent); in 1982/83 the respective figures were 6,018 and 739 (12.2 percent).

Several speakers discussed problems in Nigeria's cooperation with socialist and developing countries, its foreign policy, its culture, the effect of the ethnic factor on Nigerian policymaking, and other topics.

The exchange of views among researchers and practitioners from the socialist countries on current problems in Nigeria's development is of indisputable scientific value. In addition, the now traditional meetings of socialist experts on Nigerian affairs are of practical value because they promote cooperation between the socialist countries and the largest African country.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588

CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### AN. GROMYKO AT SOVIET-ITALIAN ROUNDTABLE ON AFRICAN PROBLEMS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 147-149

[Report on first Soviet-Italian roundtable discussion of "Current African Affairs" in Rome in November 1983]

[Text] The first Soviet-Italian "roundtable" on "Current African Affairs" was held in Rome in November 1983. It was attended by Secretary General L. Gasbarri of the Italian-African Institute, Professor B. Bernardi--head of the Department of Language and Anthropology of the Rome University School of Philology and Philosophy, political science Professor C. Rossi from the same university, history Professor M. Mozzati from the University of Pavia, coordinator V. Caputo of the Secretariat of Sahel Studies (Italian-African Institute) and Director P. Gamaccio of the Basso Foundation African Studies Center. The delegation of Soviet experts on African affairs was headed by Director An. A. Gromyko of the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the academy.

The Soviet and Italian scholars exchanged views on possible ways of overcoming the economic backwardness of the African countries, the significance of the OAU, regional organizations and regional cooperation at the present time and the political and socioeconomic development of Africa. The discussion of the ethnocultural development of African countries, particularly the uniqueness of the continent's cultures, the role of cultural heritage and Soviet-African and Italian-African cultural contacts were discussed at length. The scholars also exchanged information on African studies in the USSR and Italy.

Opening the discussion, An. A. Gromyko described the complex problems in the economic development of the African countries at the present time. He mentioned, as a positive factor, that Africa's development strategy for the 1980's contains several fundamentally new elements, such as the proposal of self-reliance, a clearer acknowledgement of the need for reforms of a social nature and an emphasis on the collective efforts of developing countries. In particular, the Lagos Plan for Action does not emphasize the adaptation of the African economy to processes in the world capitalist economy, but the objective of its independent development.

An. A. Gromyko stressed that Soviet researchers feel that the African states will be unlikely to achieve genuine economic independence and, consequently,

political independence under the conditions of capitalist development. A socialist orientation could secure the attainment of these goals. Obviously, the effective development of the African states, just as all other countries, will be impossible without an atmosphere of peace and trust throughout the world.

L. Gasbarri, who described the economic development of Africa, said that the methods of overcoming existing colossal difficulties within the framework of a specific political and socioeconomic orientation are the Africans' own affair and stressed that "models" of socioeconomic development should not be imposed on them from outside. Economic assistance from developed countries is of great importance to the African countries. For example, Italy's assistance to developing countries represents around 0.4 percent of its GDP, and 70-75 percent of this sum is sent to African countries.

During the discussion Soviet researchers stressed that socialist orientation is a natural process and that its choice by individual African countries is not the result of "outside pressure," but of the socioeconomic experience of the country.

G. V. Smirnov (USSR) noted the significance of African regional and sub-regional organizations in the coordination of joint domestic and foreign economic undertakings and the scientific, technical and cultural development of the African countries. African processes of economic integration occupy an important place in the efforts of the majority of African countries to achieve stronger political unity. Under these conditions, the priority assigned to the state sector in the African countries is the most promising element of the strategy of "collective self-reliance." Soviet researchers agreed with V. Caputo that regional economic organizations of a new type, more consistent with the interests of the African states, are now making their appearance on the continent in connection with changes in political geography.

Summing up the results of the OAU's 20 years of activity, G. Rossi described the organization's efforts to implement the Lagos Plan. He also said that the recently apparent shift in OAU activity in the direction of economic issues is due to the alleged reduction of anticolonialism's role. According to Soviet researchers, the OAU's assignment of priority to economic matters is a dictate of our time and is necessitated by the developmental requirements of the national economy in the African countries.

Analyzing the OAU's role in the resolution of the conflict in southern Africa, L. G. Bol'shov (USSR) stressed that anticolonialism and the struggle against racism and apartheid still play an important role in OAU activity and that this activity is constantly changing and taking new forms. An important feature of the 19th Session of the OAU Assembly was the unanimous condemnation, even by "moderate" African regimes, of the U.S. policy of "constructive" cooperation with Pretoria and the West's assistance of South Africa. The OAU role in the settlement of the conflicts in Chad and the Horn of Africa was the subject of a report by V. I. Gusarov (USSR). R. N. Ismagilova (USSR) spoke of the African cultural heritage's relationship to the present time. In particular, this report reflected the views of Soviet researchers on cultural development in Chad, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire and other countries.

It is still too early to speak of the possibility of national unity within the framework of political boundaries here, despite current integration processes, the consolidation of the largest existing ethnic communities and, consequently, the cultural development of these ethnic groups. Furthermore, the politicization of the ethnic factor has caused strong centrifugal tendencies to weaken consolidation processes in such large ethnic groups as the Ibo and Yoruba in Nigeria and an increase in the ethnic awareness of certain subdivisions of these groups. B. Bernardi agreed with R. N. Ismagilova's statement that theories of cultural nationalism, authenticity and negritude play a negative role in the cultural development of the African states because they tend to isolate the African cultures from the achievements of world civilization. The Italian researcher agreed with the Marxist requirement for a dialectical and historical approach to the study of cultural affairs with a view to current realities.

The two sides noted the productive nature of the discussion and agreed that it would be expedient to expand this form of cooperation between Soviet and Italian researchers of African affairs and give it a regular and long-term nature. The next Soviet-Italian roundtable discussion of "Current African Affairs" was scheduled to be held in the Soviet Union in 1985.

Soviet researchers visited the Institute of Italian Relations with the African, Latin American and Middle Eastern Countries and the Italy-USSR Society.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8589

CSO: 1807/60

BOOK ON PAKISTAN'S STATE-MONOPOLY BOURGEOIS LINK REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 170-174

[Review by N. A. Simoniya of book "Gosudarstvo i monopolisticheskaya burzhuaziya v Pakistane" [The State and the Monopolist Bourgeoisie in Pakistan] by S. F. Levin, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 272 pages]

[Text] S. F. Levin has written a number of books on the development of the grand bourgeoisie and monopolies in Pakistan.\* The subject of this review, however, is not merely a generalization and summarization of his previous works. This book also raises a number of new questions--and successfully, in our opinion--about Pakistan's social development in the 1970's and the early 1980's. The author traces the processes by which capital was concentrated and centralized in the hands of the monopolist elite of the Pakistani bourgeoisie, analyzes new aspects of these processes, particularly the development of state-monopolist tendencies, and describes the distinctive reaction of the Pakistani public to these tendencies (the Islamic criticism of monopolies).

The issue S. F. Levin raises, however, goes far beyond the boundaries of a single country. As the author correctly points out, "this problem already exists in around 20 developing states, including some of the largest, and it could arise in other newly liberated countries choosing the capitalist course of development" (p 3). He is also correct in his belief that monopolist tendencies in the developing countries are connected with the exacerbation of social, political and ideological conflicts and the appearance of a number of new problems of great significance, and that these must be taken into account in the determination of a scientifically sound strategy and the tactics of sociopolitical struggle by progressive forces.

Monopolist tendencies in some developing countries were ignored or denied by the majority of Orientalists a comparatively short time ago. This is no

\* See, for example, the following works by S. F. Levin: "Formirovaniye krupnoy burzhuazii Pakistana" [The Formation of the Pakistani Grand Bourgeoisie], Moscow, 1970; "Pakistani Monopolies and the Distinctive Features of Their Development," in "Krupnyy kapital i monopolii stran Azii" [Big Capital and Monopolies in Asian Countries], Moscow, 1970; "Monopolies in the Textile Industry," in "Pakistan. Problemy politiki i ekonomiki" [Pakistan. Political and Economic Issues], Moscow, 1978.

longer the case. Nevertheless, the insufficient analysis of this problem still gives some researchers grounds for a certain degree of skepticism and gives rise to conflicting assessments of the monopolization process under the conditions of the capitalist evolution of developing countries. As S. F. Levin says, "researchers still cannot agree on the particular stage of capitalist development in the former colonial and dependent countries that marked the rise of national monopolies. In fact, can we even say that these countries have entered a monopolist or state-monopolist stage? Or is this impossible in view of their specific form of capitalist development, multiple structure, social patterns, position in the world economic system...and so forth? Perhaps we should speak of a unique variety, differing from the one known through the experience of the developed capitalist states of Europe, the United States and Japan (or even several varieties), of capitalist evolution in the former colonial and dependent countries" (p 6).

There is no question that S. F. Levin's work helps to elucidate this matter. He provides conclusive proof, based on a thorough analysis of documented material, that the development of monopolist capital and even elements of state-monopolist capitalism in Pakistan is taking place under different historical conditions than in the developed capitalist countries, in a different sequence and with totally different forms and methods of capital concentration and centralization. Nevertheless, the author does not provide complete answers to the questions he raises. What is the reason for this? It seems to lie in the sphere of methodology.

When we ask questions about the stage (or phase) of capitalism in a specific developing country, there is almost always the assumption that this should be one of the stages of its classical model. But since the latter presupposes a certain sequence of maturation and a change of phases (the first, transitional phase, distinguished by a multiple structure, is followed by a second--the phase of mature private economic capitalism--encompassing or superseding all structures and levels of society, after which the accumulation, concentration and centralization of capital lead to the concluding phase--monopolization), we invariably try to situate the particular country in one of these phases (or stages). Some researchers cite abundant statistics on the retention of the multiple structure and the quantitative prevalence of early-capitalist (or lower) forms of production and distribution, concluding from this that the country is in the first phase of capitalist development. Others, also relying on indisputable statistics on the appearance of monopolies and even the first elements of state-monopolist capitalism, speak of the onset of the third phase. These discussions reach an inevitable impasse and each side retains its own opinion. But this happens because both sides make their point of departure the same--false, in our opinion--methodological premise, and this makes the entire discussion unproductive.

In reality, capitalism in the former colonial and semicolonial countries develops not according to the classical model, but according to a tertiary one, distinguished by a complex synthesis (or symbiosis) of structural elements characteristic of various structures and various phases of capitalism. Only this model can serve as the basis for productive scientific discussions of the real nature of the stage of capitalist evolution in a specific developing country. This approach eliminates the need to associate the specific

stage of development in a country with only a single phase of the classical model of capitalism--for instance, only the first or only the third. The retention of many social structures of the first phase of capitalism and even pre-bourgeois structures does not automatically preclude the "early" (that is, prior to the complete disappearance of the multiple structure and the end of the entire phase of mature private economic capitalism) appearance of structural elements of the third phase, largely borrowed from other countries, just as the appearance of elements of this last phase does not mean that the corresponding level of maturity in the classical model has been reached. In other words, tendencies and elements characteristic of the concluding phase of capitalism begin to appear before a society has completed the phase of its early capitalist development. This means that we are dealing with "superimposed" phases or a peculiar symbiotic form of capitalism typical of the tertiary model of its development.

One of the strong points of this work is the detailed analysis of the key role the state has played in the establishment of the grand Pakistani bourgeoisie and the appearance of monopolist tendencies. The author presents a historical overview of this process and divides the history of the state's relations with the grand bourgeoisie into four periods:

- 1) From 1947 to October 1958--prior to the appearance of national monopolies in the country;
- 2) From the end of 1958 to 1971--the formation and rapid growth of monopolist capital and elements of state-monopolist capitalism under the military bureaucratic dictatorships of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan;
- 3) From 1972 to July 1977--the legislative prohibition of monopolies, the nationalization of several monopolized industries and the state encouragement of small and medium-size businesses under the government of Z. A. Bhutto;
- 4) From July 1977 to the present time--the further intensification of monopolist tendencies under the military dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq (pp 14, 235).

The author carefully analyzes all aspects of the state's interrelations with private capital during different stages, tracing changes in the balance of class and political power in the country and in ruling groups. He demonstrates, for example, that the grand bourgeoisie played the role of a junior partner in the landowner-bourgeois bloc prior to 1958, whereas the balance of power had already changed in favor of the grand bourgeoisie during the second period and gave it a chance for direct influence in state economic policymaking (pp 15, 17). S. F. Levin describes the limitations of Ayub Khan's policy of the priority development of capitalism "from above," relying mainly on the private sector. The further economic development of Pakistan became impossible without a dramatic increase in expenditures on technically complex and capital-intensive branches of heavy industry and the introduction of the achievements of the "green revolution" in agriculture (p 21). This tipped the balance between the private and state sectors substantially in the latter's favor. These socioeconomic requirements and the important political and social upheavals of the late 1960's and early 1970's brought about the changes marking the transition to the third period.

The third period was distinguished by efforts, under the slogan of "Islamic socialism" and within the bounds of the official parliamentary system, to make certain adjustments in the onesided development of Pakistani capitalism and develop an economic strategy serving the interests of broader segments of the bourgeoisie with the support of the growing state sector. The government stressed its aim of preventing the unlimited growth of monopolist tendencies (p 39). In this respect, Z. A. Bhutto's policy was similar in many ways to I. Gandhi's policy in India prior to 1977. But just as in India, this anti-monopolism combined with the maximum promotion of capitalist development in general could not prevent the further growth of monopolization processes (including the formation of monopolistic associations in new industries), even though they took less overt forms (pp 125, 127). The attempts to use reformist methods to smooth out the sharp corners of the symbiotic model of capitalist development in Pakistan ultimately failed. The Bhutto government was unable to surmount or perceptibly alleviate the profound crisis in social structures. As a result, the military again took charge of the country.

As S. F. Levin correctly points out, the new military regime of M. Zia-ul-Haq could not simply return to the policy of Z. A. Bhutto in 1977. "This possibility was excluded by changes in objective economic and social conditions and in the requirements and aims of this development." In addition to all other factors, the very fact that this was a new regime "demanded a search for its own socioeconomic policy, differing at least externally from the previous one, to justify the military coup in the eyes of broad segments of the population" (p 69). For some reason the leaders of the regime returned to the Islamization of social and economic life. "The unique and often contradictory combination of understanding for private enterprise and attempts to give it government support on the one hand, and attempts to revive medieval institutions and standards, such as the zakat tax and the tithe, the traditional Muslim inheritance rights and so forth, on the other was characteristic of the general socioeconomic policy of the military regime" (pp 70-71).

We repeat, the distinctive features of each of the abovementioned periods in the development of Pakistani capitalism are analyzed in depth and on the basis of abundant documented material in S. F. Levin's work. The only thing the interested reader might want is a more precise description of the differences in the social aims of the military regimes of the second and fourth periods. It is possible that these would be only nuances, but they would be fairly important nuances, particularly since some of the author's statements appear to minimize these real differences. For example, on page 237 the author writes: "Of course, the development of elements of state-monopolist capitalism should not be viewed as a process connected with a well-planned and consistent state policy. In this respect, the policy of Pakistani ruling circles during different periods was based on different theories and had definite distinctive features. Regardless of these, however, the development of state-monopolist tendencies can be seen in all stages of Pakistan's capitalist evolution since the beginning of the 1960's." This statement creates the impression that the entire matter can be reduced to the subjective factor of differences between state theories and policies and the related differences in the "development of state-monopolist tendencies" (*Ibid.*). The development of state-monopolist capitalism itself allegedly took place during

all of the periods. However, the qualitative differences between the objective social aims of the political regimes in the three last stages (according to the author's system of classification) seem quite significant.

It would probably be more correct to speak only of the formation of a private monopolistic structure (and not state-monopolist capitalism) with the active assistance of the state during the period of Ayub Khan's dictatorship. At least, this was in effect the process of the development of important prerequisites for the future formation of the structural elements of state-monopolist capitalism. The author's discussion of cartel agreements or the domination of entire industries or regions by individual firms, families and groups, the colossal profits produced by this "monopolist practice," the extensive sales of state enterprises in the state sector to the bourgeois elite and so forth (pp. 17, 19) testify specifically to the development of two factors characteristic of the second period: private monopolies and state capitalism (primarily in the form of regulation). These processes, however, were accompanied, on the one hand, by the reversion of colonial feudal structures and, on the other, by the continued development of early capitalist relations. This is why the military dictatorship of the second period objectively (regardless of its subjective intentions and policies) had to reflect this entire symbiosis—or, more precisely, a specific compromise between its elements—in its policy.

Therefore, the military regime of Ayub Khan did not represent a classical variety of Bonapartism. In spite of all the complexity of its objective social aims, however, the main purpose of the compromise it represented consisted in the creation of the social conditions needed for the establishment of Pakistan capitalism, and in this respect the classical bonapartist principle was the main feature of this symbiotic regime. The inability to find and implement an appropriate socio-political compromise inevitably led to the collapse of the military regime, which occurred at a time of the exacerbation of the social contradictions in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

The military regime of Zia-ul-Haq assumed power under different historical conditions, distinguished by a higher developmental level of monopolistic tendencies. Its major objective aim was the guarantee of the prevalence of state monopoly, not simply of large capital, including private monopolist capital. This was the reason for the apparent duality of Zia's regime, which closely with private monopolies but preserved a substantial state sector precisely because this corresponded objectively to the aims of state-monopolist capitalism.\* It loudly proclaimed the "Islamic

\* This is a clear and clear illustration of the dialectics of the establishment of state-monopolist capitalism in the East: Something that is a drawback from the standpoint of the conditions and prospects of a development of conventional private economic capitalism (for example, the increasing capital requirements of production or the multifold—several times—increasing increase in the amount of initial capital needed for the formation of a "temporary group "A" enterprise) turns into an advantage, accelerating the establishment of state-monopolist capitalism, which is achieved by government intervention directly in the capitalist process.

of the economy, but the pursuit of this policy eventually promoted state-monopolist tendencies (for example, 75 percent of the zakat revenues collected were turned over to central and provincial funds, and not to local zakat committees). S. F. Levin's conclusion that one of the socioeconomic results of the current regime "might be the further intensification of state-monopolist tendencies, and in an extremely distinctive, Islamic form" (p 238) is absolutely correct. Obviously, all of this will happen only if the Zia-ul-Haq regime is capable of implementing the extremely complicated sociopolitical compromise.

There is no question that the most interesting sections of the work include those revealing a distinctive and extremely important feature of the development of monopolist capital--the use of traditional forms of capital mobilization and interaction. The author correctly points out the broader regional implications of this problem. "The retention of caste, religious-communal, clan, ethnic and other traditional organizations and systems of mutual support and crediting by the bourgeoisie of several Eastern countries (Indian, Pakistani, Indonesian, Arabic and others) adds considerable particular features to the development of class and intraclass conflicts in these countries" (p 5). One of S. F. Levin's achievements is a thorough analysis of this phenomenon. He demonstrates, in particular, that the presence of traditional relations and organizations can give rise to monopolist regulation in a specific industry. "Almost all Pakistani monopolists came from traditional communities of this kind," the author writes, "and monopolist regulation under these conditions can easily be conducted privately, solely on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement and with a large number of participants" (p 131). "The monopolist groups of the Pakistani bourgeoisie are like the tip of an iceberg, with numerous businessmen from the same community making up the base" (p 103). Besides this, S. F. Levin sheds light on the international aspect of this phenomenon. Tens of thousands of members of communities from Pakistan (and former colonial India) have established themselves in many Asian and African countries and have even begun to penetrate the European and American business community in recent decades. This has resulted in the establishment of several international trade and industrial centers made up of people from the Khoja, Meman, Bohra and Parsi communities, the members of which live in different countries and are citizens of different countries.... They maintain close contacts with one another, however, and the interests of the members of each of these unique international trade and industrial centers are still closely interrelated" (p 96).

The only comment we would like to make in connection with this interesting and even intriguing subject is that this aspect of the formation of Pakistani monopolies could hardly be described as the development of capitalism "in breadth as well as in depth" (p 88). This contradicts the traditional belief of the development of capitalism in breadth as the development of specifically democratic, non-monopolist capitalism. This criticism is justified by the author's own conclusive statements about the extraordinarily high level of direct monopoly control over industrial assets in the Pakistani private corporate sector even in comparison to many highly developed capitalist countries (p 94).

The author's idea that the involvement of members of traditional communities in the monopolization process leads to the modernization of many of their

relations and the use of traditional institutions for contemporary purposes (p 102 et passim) is quite interesting. Perhaps more emphasis should be placed on this aspect. Then the reader could have a clearer understanding of the vehement protests of monopolization tendencies in Pakistan on the part of ideological and political representatives of traditional structures which are still uninvolved or are involved only to a minimal degree in this process by which the functions of traditional institutions are being updated.

The publication of this work by S. F. Levin represents a new advance in the analysis of an important and politically pertinent topic. The book provides food for thought and helps to clarify many of the aspects of the formation of monopolist capital and state-monopolist capitalism in the Eastern countries. For this reason, it is of indisputable value.

**COPYRIGHT:** "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### BOOK ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF ASIAN COUNTRIES REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 11 Jul 84) pp 175-177

[Review by Yu. M. Osipov of book "Ekonomicheskaya integratsiya razvivayushchikhsya stran Azii: vozmozhnosti, trudnosti, predely" [The Economic Integration of Developing Asian Countries: Possibilities, Difficulties, Limitations] by G. I. Chufrin, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry [Izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 116 pages]

[Text] An interesting feature of the current era is the more active involvement of developing countries in world integration processes on the vertical (relations between the center and the periphery) and the horizontal (regional and subregional) levels. A tendency to seek more realistic development alternatives, however, has been clearly apparent since the first half of the 1970's. The so-called strategy of collective self-reliance is one of the most important of these. According to its supporters, it should expand the opportunities and increase the potential of newly liberated states for mutual cooperation and thereby counteract the negative outside influence which has grown much stronger as a result of the exacerbation of structural crises and inflation in the world capitalist economy. The apparent expansion of the zone of "peripheral integration" and the attempts to intensify it by introducing more effective instruments of cooperation are not merely the result of failures connected with miscalculations in import substitution or ineffective export policies. The search for new approaches primarily signals the reaction of exploited countries to the crisis of dependent development and is indissolubly connected with the program of collective action designed to democratize the international economic order.

The author of this book had the difficult task of examining the economic integration of developing countries as a special category, revealing its distinctive features, analyzing the possibilities of mutual cooperation with examples from the Asian experience and describing the difficulties impeding this process. G. I. Chufrin undertook this task with the aid of extensive literary sources. A critical analysis of this literature gave him some idea of the reasons for the disagreements on many aspects, including cardinal ones, of the integration of developing countries, stemming primarily from the great diversity of their economic ties, differences in classification systems and the indistinct boundaries between them. In spite of the fact that this research is based on information about the Asian countries, it would be no exaggeration to say that the comprehensive exposition of the problem and the

serious analysis of this topic allowed for the terminological clarification of the category of "economic integration of developing countries" and even made a deeper understanding--which is probably more important--of the very essence of the matter possible.

The author's description of the development of the integration process in newly liberated states warrants special attention. He included all of the factors influencing "peripheral" reproduction. He also considered the distinctive features of transitional relations, within the framework of which political institutions and socioeconomic structures are transformed and the general balance of so-called "asymmetrical interdependence" changes. According to the author, the economic convergence of developing countries begins with the gradual replacement of traditional forms of foreign economic relations with more complex economic ties. The coordination of actions to protect the interests of producers and exporters of raw materials is most typical of the first stage. The tendency toward commercial regionalism with the corresponding changes in customs, payment and financial mechanisms grows stronger in the next stage. Finally, during the third and final stage, the process is enriched by elements of production, scientific and technical cooperation and the mutual exchange of capital and manpower. According to the author, this is how the integration of developing countries reaches its highest point (and maximum) and how its content as a specific political economic category undergoes qualitative changes.

We will have more to say about this below. Here we would like to point out the following fact. The study of the Asian region corroborates the author's thesis that no perceptible terminological boundaries can be drawn between "economic cooperation" and "economic integration" in the developing world. If the former stimulates the convergence of the partners' economies by promoting mutually beneficial exchange, it becomes an essential stage of the general integration process and even part of the process. Here G. I. Chufrin certainly does not mean that the process of sequential integration should be examined in its "pure form." His system of classification is not dogma, but merely a procedural guide for the analysis of real processes, which are obviously more complex and diverse than any theoretical construct. Whatever problems the author examines--whether it is the disclosure of the objective basis of the establishment and development of integration processes in the newly liberated countries or, for instance, the analysis of its stimuli, its nature and its directions--he insists that unequivocal and categorical interpretations of the integration process are invalid. The environment and the broad range of intrasocial relations, the confrontation of political forces, uneven development and many other factors naturally introduce modifications (often quite perceptible) into the sequential development of the integration process.

Fortunately, economic aspects of integration are closely related to political factors in the book. There is no question that the developmental dynamics of the latter, reflecting changes in the balance of power within countries and in their foreign policy, mounting conflicts between the periphery and the centers of world capitalism and internal strife in the newly liberated states, can reorder the priorities of "peripheral integration" substantially. They can give rise to new varieties of cooperation ("collective self-reliance"), cause the deceleration or regression of processes and even--under specific

conditions--eliminate the progressive features objectively present in the political economic category of the "economic integration of developing countries." It would be absolutely wrong to underestimate the danger of the involvement of some subregional groups in the system of multileveled ("asymmetrical") integration of a completely different type--by means of the conclusion of "tripartite agreements" (technology from the West, money from OPEC and manpower from other countries), the introduction of more subtle forms of financial neocolonialism, the modification of zonal relations with the retention of the leader's "trustee" role (the zone of the French franc) and so forth. In short, as the author correctly points out, the objective tendency toward integration can also be used in the interests of imperialism, particularly if anticommunist and pro-Western forces have considerable influence in the political structure of the integrated groups of developing countries and if transnational corporations have a solid position in their economic structure. It is true that the successes of real socialism and the intense struggle for the new international economic order are creating prerequisites which improve the chances for multilateral cooperation in principle. Again, however, their implementation is impeded by a countertendency: the appearance (accompanying the development of the former colonies and semicolonies) of new forms of dependence--technological, investment and monetary.

The mechanisms of monetary and financial integration are analyzed in detail in the book, but more attention should be given to such matters as the selective effect of international capital markets on integration processes in the newly federated states (particularly the Eurocurrency market), factors diminishing the impact of OPEC financial assistance, the new strategy of the IMF and World Bank, and, finally, the prospects for the reorganization of the international currency order. All of these matters are now acquiring primary importance, are the subject of lively discussion and will indisputably leave their mark on integration processes in the developing world and change the implications of these processes.

In this connection, it would be best to return to the abovementioned procedural system and make a few comments about the limitations of the category of the "economic integration of developing countries." The author correctly stresses that its essence and features are colored by the aims and requirement of the present stage of the national liberation revolution as part of the world revolutionary process. This type of integration, which we will call special, reflects the distinctive features of the movement for economic independence within the framework of transitional relations. The evolution of the latter has not transformed the prevailing structure into the prevailing productive method in the majority of developing states, although in some countries (particularly in Latin America) all of the components of the capitalist structure and even tendencies toward state-monopolist capitalism--although the dependent type--are clearly apparent. There is no question that the slow maturation of formative structures in the Asian and African regions is still impeding the expansion and intensification of integration processes. Nevertheless, the idea that the integration of developing countries evolves from an "intermediate" form to the capitalist or socialist form only because the development of productive forces reaches a certain peak seems quite debatable. In our opinion, the author has underestimated the prevailing political tendency and

the consequences of accelerated uneven development. The facts, including those cited in the book, conclusively testify that integration processes in some parts of the developing world--and not only in Latin America--are already acquiring quite distinct capitalist features even though they are not losing all of their anti-imperialist thrust. In fact, it is hardly a valid statement that foreign economic ties and relations within the subregional groups of even states which have progressed quite far along the path of capitalist development acquire the features of the capitalist type of integration only because a certain critical point has been reached and has introduced qualitative changes into the country's production base.

The question of the state's role in integration strategy is directly related to this problem. The author's cogent examination of this complex matter corroborates the fundamental conclusion that no form of integration can progress successfully under present conditions without the guiding influence of the state. The state reflects the position of the "average social force," but, and this is quite important, only within the framework of the prevailing political tendency or outlook. This is why the author sounds too categorical when he says that the conflict between the interests of the national bourgeoisie as a class and the interests of its individual members in the development of integration processes is dialectically resolved only in the stronger relative independence of the state. This means that advances in integration are accompanied by the increasing autonomy of the state in the social system. In our opinion, this statement requires at least a detailed explanation.

Finally, one last comment. The author presents a quite impressive set of criteria to judge the effectiveness of the integration process from the macroeconomic standpoint. He goes beyond the purely quantitative approach, presupposing the assessment of integration primarily from the standpoint of the maximization of growth. And this is correct. But the author's research method requires the use of social criteria of effectiveness in his analysis. The shift toward strategies of the endogenous type in the developing world is due largely to the dramatic deterioration of social conditions and is accompanied in many Afro-Asian countries by a change in previously planned priorities. Although their new aims (the theory of "collective self-reliance") have still not acquired their final analytical form and are often interpreted in different ways, there is reason to believe that the integration policy of developing states will take social factors into account from now on.

These comments attest more to the complexity of the issues raised than to shortcomings in the book. On the whole, G. I. Chufrin's research is highly professional and he proposes and substantiates a number of new ideas and premises of considerable value in the further analysis of the theory of integration and socioeconomic evolution in the developing world.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588  
CSO: 1807/60

## INTERNATIONAL

### MONOGRAPH ON NIGERIAN PROLETARIAT FORMATION REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 84 (signed to press 31 Jul 84) pp 198-200

[Review by A. S. Oganova of book "Rabochiy klass sovremennoy Nigerii" [The Working Class in Present-Day Nigeria] by T. S. Denisova, Moscow, Glav. red. vost. lit-ry izd-va "Nauka," 1983, 166 pages]

[Text] In the 1970's and early 1980's Soviet researchers of Oriental and African affairs have paid close attention to the working class of the Afro-Asian countries. In addition to books and articles on general aspects of the development of the Afro-Asian proletariat during the years of independence,<sup>1</sup> studies of the formation of the working class in individual countries, dating back to the colonial era, have also been published.<sup>2</sup> The value of the works on individual countries has been measured primarily in all of the new information which has been made available to the academic community and has increased our understanding of individual segments of the working class in the developing countries. This, in turn, has contributed to the accumulation of information for the further analysis of the development of the Afro-Asian working class as a whole. The studies of individual countries have also discussed and analyzed problems constituting the focus of attention in general works, and in this way they have contributed to the analysis of problems on the continental and regional levels.

The subject of this review is the first Soviet study of the formation and politico-organizational establishment of the working class of the Federal Republic of Nigeria throughout almost the entire 20th century, but with an emphasis on the period of independent development. The book is based on extensive research, including industrial censuses and surveys, documents of the colonial administration and the official publications of independent Nigeria, the documents of trade unions and political parties, articles in the local press and sociological studies by Nigerian and Western researchers.

T. S. Denisova divides the history of the formation of the Nigerian working class into three stages. The first lasted from the end of the 19th century to the end of World War II. The backbone of the industrial proletariat took shape and trade unions grew during the second stage (1945-1960). During the third stage--independent development--the stabilization of the working class continued as a result of accelerated urbanization and industrialization. These divisions seem valid to us. They conform to the general system used

in Soviet literature on the working class of English-speaking West Africa. The fact that the author uses this system to analyze Nigerian information corroborates the common chronology of the formation of the working class in the region.

The author raises a number of questions about the formation of the Nigerian proletariat. The training of skilled personnel in the country is an interesting topic. As the author correctly points out (p 46), the struggle for the right to professional training and education corresponding to the current level of productive forces is one of the labor movement's important functions.

T. S. Denisova cites interesting information about the training of skilled personnel at enterprises of transnational corporations in Nigeria and proves that although these corporations work in their own interest and are guided by their desire for monopolist profits, they objectively promote the creation of a modern industrial proletariat by organizing fairly broad training programs for skilled manpower.

The author reveals tendencies toward changes in the status of the Nigerian working class throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods and traces the gradual differentiation of the wage scales of various categories of workers, as a result of which, in her opinion, differences arose in the living and working conditions of workers and prepared the soil for the emergence of a more privileged substratum--the "labor aristocracy." T. S. Denisova includes high-salaried workers employed at large capitalist enterprises and representing occupations which are still not common in Nigeria--operators and automatic assembly workers--in this category. She uses the term "labor aristocracy" only in relation to the financial status of highly skilled workers and does not discuss the sociopsychological aspects of this phenomenon--the spirit of class cooperation and the social-reformist illusions that are characteristic of this category. This approach seems onesided and even false because it leads to the invalid inclusion of specific groups of workers in the "labor aristocracy" in the classical sense of the term only on the basis of high wages and a high level of skills. The current labor movement in Tropical Africa includes many examples of participation by workers of this category in the struggle to improve the socioeconomic status of the working people and in the work of progressive trade unions.

T. S. Denisova adheres to a tendency which was evident in Soviet studies of the African working class in the 1970's--a tendency to analyze the development of the sociopsychological features of the African proletariat by first examining the process in Nigeria. Citing the findings of specific sociological studies and, what is particularly interesting, excerpts from fiction and non-fictional essays, she analyzes various spheres of the Nigerian worker's life--home, work and leisure. In our opinion, the analysis of the effect of the production situation on the social psychology of workers should have been more detailed. After all, it is precisely in the work culture that the influence of traditionalism gradually weakens. The author has also found extremely valuable information in the accounts of the English sociologist and survey English researcher H. Poll conducted in Nigeria during the 1950's and the first half of the 1970's.

The origins and development of the labor movement in the country from the end of the 19th century to the present day are examined in detail. The history of the Nigerian trade unions and their struggle for unity is particularly interesting. The author reveals the main tendencies in the development of the strike movement. She says (pp 118-119) that several of the strikers' demands have been connected not with capitalist exploitation, but with the absence of industrial skills. This sheds light on some of the distinctive features of the strike movement in Tropical Africa. The section on the particular features of the political role of union leaders is quite interesting and original. The author gives the reader a chance to learn more about the people who were largely responsible for the development of the Nigerian union movement from the 1940's through the 1970's. In her conclusion, the author correctly underscores the fact that the working class and trade unions of Nigeria have become an important sociopolitical force with considerable influence in national development.

The shortcomings of the work include the excessively descriptive, non-analytical narration in some sections of the book, particularly the second chapter, on the socioeconomic status of the working class. On the whole, however, T. S. Denisova's work, which is based on considerable research, adds much to our knowledge of the working class in the largest country of Tropical Africa--Nigeria.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. In particular, see: A. I. Sobolev, "The Role of the Working Class in the Social Progress of Developing Countries," in "Rabocheye dvizheniye v osvobodivshikhsya stranakh Azii i Severnoy Afriki" [The Labor Movement in the Newly Liberated Asian and North African Countries], Moscow, 1981; S. I. Kuznetsova, "Sotsial'naya struktura afrikanskogo goroda" [The Social Structure of the African City], Moscow, 1972; L. A. Fridman and S. V. Voronin, "Industrialization and the Afro-Asian Proletariat," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1980, Nos 10, 11; Idem, "Hired Labor and the Working Class in the Newly Liberated Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1982, No 2; Idem, "The Contemporary Afro-Asian Industrial Proletariat," ibid., 1982, No 5; and others.
2. See, for example: Yu. I. Komar, "Rabochiy klass Respubliki Zair" [The Working Class of the Republic of Zaire], Moscow, 1974; M. F. Vidyasova, "Rabochiy klass v sotsial'noy strukture Tunisa" [The Working Class in the Tunisian Social Structure], Moscow, 1975; V. A. Dol'nikova, "Rabochiy klass TAILANDA" [The Working Class of Thailand], Moscow, 1971; S. M. Tsymal, "The Origins and Status of the Working Class of Senegal," RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, 1979, No 5; and many others.

COPYRIGHT: "Narody Azii i Afriki"  
Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588

CSO: 1807/60

- END -

**END OF  
FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

1/3/85